BD 

541 

Es 


UC-NRLF 


$B    M7    SSfl 


-) 


THE  CONCEPT  OF  CONTROL 


BY 

SA VILLA  ALICE  ELKUS,  Ph.D. 


ARCHIVES   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

BDITED    BT 

FREDEBICK  J.  E.  WOODBRIDGE 


No.  1,  Skptembeb,  1907 


Columbia  University  Contributions  to  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  Vol.  XVIII.,  No.  1 


NEAV  YOBK 

THE   SCIENCE   PRESS 
1907 


<c- 


Press  op 
i  Era  Printing  Company 

LANCASTER,  PA. 


(fJidO^p^ 


1^  ,  C^M/ 


INTRODUCTION 

In  the  various  attempts  to  render  an  adequate  description  of  the 
world  of  experience  as  presented  in  the  history  of  thought,  we  find 
recurring^  such  conceptions  as  purpose,  teleology,  final  cause,  design,^ 
to  denote  certain  features  which  have  been  deemed  indispensable  to 
an  exhaustive  interpretation  of  reality.  Upon  reflection  it  appears 
that  these  categories  and  their  like  constitute  so  many  variants  of 
the  wider  concept  of  control;  and  as  such  express  specific  ways  in 
which  control  has  been  apprehended.  That  is,  these  different  predi- 
cates are  diverse  methods  of  explaining  control,  of  making  explicit 
elements  thought  to  be  involved  in  its  postulation. 

In  the  present  essay,  I  propose  to  examine  various  typical  con- 
ceptions of  control  as  expressed  or  implied  in  the  respective  theories 
of  philosophy,  with  the  view  to  determine  in  what  facts  or  ultimate 
assumptions  these  conceptions  have  their  basis.  To  the  same  end 
the  investigation  will  consider  the  concept  of  control  as  involved  in 
the  fundamental  principles  of  the  science  of  biology  and  in  the 
formulations  of  mechanical  explanation. 

The  historical  treatment  of  the  subject  falls  naturally  into  two 
main  divisions,  distinguished,  in  one  way  at  least,  by  their  methods 
of  approaching  philosophical  problems.  These  divisions  are  occu- 
pied with  the  metaphysical  and  epistemological  discussions,  respect- 
ively, the  latter  including  the  theory  of  pragmatism. 

Since  the  science  of  biology,  in  its  explanation  of  organic  nature,, 
has  employed  certain  categories  generally  regarded  as  peculiar  to- 
its  subject-matter,  the  third  section  will  consider  the  notion  of  con- 
trol as  involved  in  the  characteristic  principles  of  biology.  Finally, 
mechanism,  which  formulates  the  principles  obtaining  in  inorganic 
nature,  or  the  physical  w^orld,  will  be  treated  in  the  fourth  section. 

A  comparison  of  the  results  obtained  from  these  various  sources 
will  serve  to  manifest  those  characteristics  common  to  all  the  con- 
ceptions, and  at  the  same  time  indicate  the  ground  of  any  peculiar 
features  deemed  essential  to  the  category.  Such  an  analysis  of  the 
data  presented  will  seek  to  determine  those  elements  of  the  concep- 
tion which  may  be  retained  as  justifiable,  and  those  which  must  be 
rejected  as  unwarranted  by  experience;  those  factors  which  are 
purely  gratuitous,  and  those  which  are  the  outcome  of  a  logical 
demand. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

INTRODUCTION    iii 


CHAPTER   I 

COSMOLOGICAL 

The  concept  of  control  as  a  thesis  of  the  philosophical  movement  expressed 
in  the  theories  of  Heraclitus,  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras  and  Democritus 
— The  thesis  in  the  fragments  of  Heraclitus— Empedocles,  Anaxagoras 
and  Democritus— The  concept  indicated  in  the  *  Dialogues  '  of  Plato — 
The  concept  in  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle— Stoicism— Scholastic  philos- 
ophy not  occupied  with  the  question  of  control— The  concept  in  the 
philosophy  of  Spinoza— The  concept  in  the  philosophy  of  Leibniz— Com- 
parison of  the  concepts  in  the  cosmological  theories  1 

CHAPTER    II 

EPISTEMOLOGICAL 

The  epistemologies  of  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume  and  Kant  concerned  with  the 
locus  of  control;  these  writers  give  speculative  accounts  of  the  teleolog- 
ical  aspect  of  nature— Locke's  position  with  respect  to  control  in 
epistemology ;  his  theory  of  design  in  nature— Berkeley's  theory  of  con- 
trol and  design- Hume's  position  with  respect  to  control— Kant's  theory 
of  control;  his  conception  of  purpose  in  nature— The  concept  of  control 
in  pragmatism  19 

CHAPTER    III 

BIOLOGICAL 

The  concept  as  revealed  in  the  peculiar  categories  of  biology 29 

CHAPTER    IV 

MECHANISM 

The  concept  in  the  method  and  constructions  of  physical  science  34 


CHAPTER   V 

CONCLUSIONS  AND  BEMAEKS 

Comparison  of  all  the  conceptions  which  have  been  discussed— Purpose  and 
mechanism  two  diverse  ways  of  describing  control— Application  of  the 
concept  in  the  sciences  of  mechanics,  economics,  sociology 39 


IV 


THE  CONCEPT  OF  CONTKOL 
CHAPTER  I 

COSMOLOGICAL 

The  philosophical  movement  embodied  in  the  theories  of  Hera- 
clitus,  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras  and  Democritus  may  be  interpreted 
as  one  of  which  an  important  function  is  the  expression  of  the  recog- 
nition of  the  concept  of  control  in  description  and  explanation  of 
the  world,  and  the  discovery  of  such  conditions  as  permit  its  affirma- 
tion. This  movement  accepts  as  a  primary  datum  of  experience 
general  flux  or  change,  and  superimposes  the  further  reflection  that 
the  change  is  regulated,  that  it  is  not  merely  change ;  its  method  may 
be  comprehended.  For  the  detailed  exposition  of  this  interpretation 
we  must  have  recourse  to  the  respective  theories  of  the  philosophers. 

Heraclitus,  purporting  to  render  an  analysis  of  the  world  of 
experience,  maintains  as  his  grand  discovery  that  in  addition  to  the 
flux  of  sensible  things  there  exists  a  principle  of  a  different  nature. 
Fragments^  25,  26,  41  and  42,  43,  44,  62,  proclaim  the  existence  of 
universal  change;  while  in  contradistinction  fragment  1  announces: 
*^ .  .  .,  tv  TTovra  civai^'  (all  things  are  one) ;  there  is  connection  of 
these  diverse  sensible  things.  For  the  elucidation  of  this  phrase 
we  must  turn  to  what  Heraclitus  deems  his  unique  contribution. 

Fragment  18  states:  '*  Of  all  whose  words  I  have  heard,  none 
has  attained  to  this,  to  know  that  wisdom  {<to<^6v)  is  from  all  things 
separate."  As  to  the  nature  of  this  wisdom,  different  from  all 
things,  fragment  19  asserts:  ** Wisdom  is  one,  to  know  the  thought 
{yvilifi-qv^  by  which  all  things  are  steered  through  all  things." 

That  is,  this  yvw/Ai;  (thought,  intelligence)  is  a  principle  'steer- 
ing,' directing  the  sensible  flux,  existing  in  the  dynamic  world  and 
perceptible  to  intelligence  or  wisdom"  (a-o<^ta).  As  to  the  specific 
characteristics  which  have  afforded  the  ground  for  the  observation 
of  the  existence  of  this  yvw/xr/  in  all  things,  we  learn  that  "^  there  is 
order  preserved  in  the  events,  there  is  regulation  of  the  happenings ; 
the  manifold  is  a  cosmos.  (Indicated  in  Fr.  20)  :  ''This  order 
(koct/xoi/)  which  is  the  same  in  all  things,  no  one  of  gods  or  men  has 
made ;  but  it  was  ever,  is  now,  and  ever  shall  be,  an  ever-living  fire, 
fixed  measures  of  it  kindling  and  fixed  measures  going  out."  (Also 
indicated  in  Fr.  28,  29,  61.) 

*  Bywater,  '  Heracliti  Ephesii  Reliquiae.' 

1 


V 


2     ;  ;      \      1  [THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

:'A\]  diversity  constitutes  one  process  (Fr.  24,  35,  36,  39,  40,  57) 
by  means  of  a  principle  of  connection  called  harmony  (apfiovLr)) , 
whose  essence  is  the  holding  of  differences  together,  the  combining 
of  two  opposites  into  one.      (Indicated  in  Fr.  45,  46,  56,  59.) 

The  general  thesis  of  this  doctrine  of  Heraclitus  may  be  sum- 
marized as  follows :  The  world  of  continuous  flux  is  described  as 
a  cosmos;  succession  is  restrained,  order  and  regularity  must  be 
attributed  to  it.  Such  a  process  can  be  comprehended  only  in  terms 
of  the  principle  by  which  it  is  controlled.  This  principle  is  not 
itself  subject  to  the  flux,  but  it  exists  as  a  static  factor  inherently 
in  the  process  it  controls  or  regulates.  It  is  designated  yvw/Aiy 
(thought,  purpose),  since  it  is  the  permanent  alone  which  is  intel- 
ligible, it  is  by  virtue  of  the  existence  of  control  that  we  can  under- 
stand ;  the  changing  constitutes  the  incomprehensible.  ^ 

In  the  systems  of  Empedocles  and  Anaxagoras  there  is  expressed 
the  conviction  that  the  world  presented  in  immediate  knowledge 
is  one  stage  in  a  continuous  process,  where  method  is  dominant. 
Thus  Empedocles:  ''  For  know  that  all  things  have  understanding 
(<t>p6vrj(TLv)  and  their  share  of  intelligence."^ 

What  is,  is  somehow  an  embodiment  of  what  was,  and  what  will 
be,  is  somehow  contained  in  what  now  exists.  To  account  for  the 
world  of  different  objects,  of  controlled  movement,  is  the  problem 
of  these  philosophers.  Hence  they  first  proceed  to  maintain  that 
change  in  the  sense  of  absolute  origination  and  annihilation  is  unreal. 

Empedocles :  ' '  There  is  no  origination  of  anything  that  is  mortal, 
nor  yet  any  end  in  baneful  death;  but  only  mixture  (/^ct^i's)  and 
separation  (SioAAa^ts)  of  what  is  mixed,  but  men  call  this  'origina- 
tion' (<^v(ns)."2 

Anaxagoras:  ''For  nothing  comes  into  being,  nor  yet  does  any- 
thing perish,  but  there  is  mixture  and  separation  of  things  that  are. ' " 

To  explain  the  character  of  all  change  and  the  existence  of 
distinct  objects,  unchanging  and  eternal  elements  must  be  posited. 
Empedocles  names  four  of  these  original  elements,  the  four  roots 
(pt^w/AttTa)  of  all  things,— fire,  air,  earth,  water;  and  as  causes  of 
their  movement,  two  others,  love  and  hate,  which  are  combining  and 
separating  forces.  In  addition,  there  is  introduced  a  principle  of 
measure  in  the  mixture  of  elements;  reason  (Aoyos)  governs  the 
peculiar  proportion  of  parts  which  determines  the  different  objects.  * 
Anaxagoras  maintains  that  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  the  perma- 

*A.  Fairbanks,  *  The  First  Philosophers  of  Greece,'  p.  186,  line  231. 

^Loc.  cit.,  p.  162,  line  36. 

3  hoc.  cit.,  p.  244,  Fr.  17. 

*  Arist.,  *De  Part.  An.,'  I.,  1.  642,  a  18. 


C08M0L0G1CAL  3 

nent  existences,  the  seeds  ( cnrepfmra )  of  all  things,  originally  together. 
vova-  (mind),  an  external  element,  produces  motion  in  the  mixture 
and  directs  the  course  of  movement,  resulting  in  the  world  of  dis-  ', 
tinct  objects.  ''And  whatever  things  were  to  be,  and  whatever 
things  are,  as  many  as  are  now,  and  whatever  shall  be,  all  these  mind 
arranged  in  order.  "^  n 

Democritus  is  impressed  with  the  same  fact  of  an  ordered  world 
ancT^is  likewise  confronted  with  the  same  problem — the  explanation 
of  such  a  world.  The  extent  to  which  he  has  surpassed  his  predeces- 
sors in  the  superiority  of  his  conception  is  evidenced  in  the  embodi- 
ment of  his  formulation  in  the  mechanical  theory,  which,  in  its  main  ^ 
outlines,  constitutes  the  modern  physical  theory.  Similar  to  Empe- 
docles  and  Anaxagoras,  he  posits  permanent  elements  as  the  primary, 
necessary  hypothesis  for  all  explanation.  But  the  nature  of  these 
elements  is  such  that,  granted  their  existence,  all  other  conditions 
may  be  subsequently  deduced.  No  external  forces  such  as  love  and 
hate  and  mind  are  necessary  to  cause  and  regulate  movement;  the 
atoms  suffice  for  all  these  functions. 

Concerning  the  nature  of  these  atoms,  we  are  informed  that  they 
are  infinitely  small,  indestructible,  homogeneous,  impenetrable  bodies, 
alike  in  essence,  but  different  in  size  and  form.  They  are  endowed 
with  perpetual  motion  ( dtStos  KLvrjais ) ,  whose  direction  is  guided  by 
no  disparate  principle,  but  is  due  to  a  principle  immanent  in  the 
atoms.  Thus  :  ' '  X€kt€ov  rCva  kCvtjo-lv  kcli  tl<s  17  Kara  <f>vaLV  avrwv  KLvr]crL<s  ' ' 
(and  there  is  a  certain  movement  of  those  primary  bodies  which  is 
a  natural  movement).^ 

The  void  {t6k€v6v)j  for  Democritus,  is  the  logical  consequent  of 
the  self -moving  atoms,  since  to  render  possible  motion  thought  is 
obliged  to  conceive  the  void. 

Thus  in  the  doctrine  of  Democritus  is  manifested  the  position 
that  thought,  in  its  endeavor  to  attain  explanation,  is  compelled  to 
postulate  permanent  elements  in  self -regulated  motion  (the  atoms). , 
With  this  postulate  granted,  all  subsequent  constructions  are  neces- 
sary deductions,  thereby  presenting  a  system  logical  throughout,  a 
system  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  explanation. 

Summarizing,  then,  the  import  of  the  theories  of  Empedocles, 
Anaxagoras  and  Democritus,  we  obtain  the  following:  An  inspection 
of  these  theories  carries  with  it  the  recognition  that  the  same  '^ 
problem  inspires  them  all.  A  world,  the  constitution  of  which  is  f 
described  in  the  first  instance  as  dynamic,  must  in  addition  be  char- 
acterized as  a  process  imbued  with  order,  or  as  a  movement  con- 
trolled.    To  explain  this  regulated  world-movement  there  is  assumed 

^  Fairbanks,  loc.  cit.,  Fr.  6. 

=  Arist.,  '  de  Cselo,'  III.,  2-300  b. 


v^ 


4  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

in  every  case  the  existence  of  permanent  elements  in  motion.  In  the 
theories  of  Empedocles  and  Anaxagoras,  the  regulating  principle  is 
V  embodied  in  elements  other  than  the  ones  affected,  while  according 
to  Democritus  the  movement  is  determined  by  the  static  properties 
of  the  atoms.  In  all  the  doctrines,  however,  the  guiding  principle 
is  a  constituent  factor  of  the  world,  but  the  explanation  of  Democ- 
ritus holds  its  superiority  in  being  natural  as  well  as  cosmic,  in 
contrast  to  the  artificial  account  necessitated  by  the  character  of  the 
elements  in  the  theories  of  Empedocles  and  Anaxagoras. 

This  conclusion  accords,  then,  with  the  doctrine  of  Heraclitus, 
in  holding  that  explanation  of  the  cosmos  demands  the  existence  of 
a  permanent  element  determining  the  world  change ;  which  principle 
is  contained  immanently  in  the  series  of  events  it  controls. 

In  Plato's  doctrine  of  'ideas'  the  existence  of  the  rational  is  so 
emphatically  affirmed  that  to  it  alone  is  attributed  the  status  of  the 
real.  The  flux  of  sensible  experience,  the  immediate,  the  particular, 
is  relegated  to  the  realm  of  mere  becoming  ( yo/eo-ts ) ,  of  mere  appear- 
ance. Antithetically,  the  ideas  are  eternal,  universal,  immutable, 
are  manifested  to  reason  alone  and  constitute  the  realm  of  real  being 
(ovo-ia).  Sensible  objects  are  real  only  in  so  far  as  they  'participate' 
in  the  nature  of  the  ideas.  With  the  problem  of  the  relation  of 
these  two  spheres  we  are  not  here  concerned. 

A  second  feature  of  the  ideas,  and  one  which  is  no  less  emphatic- 
ally intimated,  is  that  of  their  connection  and  dependence.  The 
relationship  of  subordination  among  ideas  is  essential  to  their  exist- 
ence and  to  the  existence  of  the  universe.  Conceptions  of  measure, 
harmony,  symmetry,  order  and  law  occupy  a  superior  position  in 
the  structure  of  the  world,  and  everywhere  exhibit  their  dominion. 
Finally,  supreme  among  ideas,  the  highest  of  all  abstractions,  the 
principle  of  the  harmonious  relationship  of  ideas,  and  thus  of  all 
'being,'  reigns  the  'idea  of  the  good.' 

Thus  in  the  'Republic'  the  ideas  are  designated  as  'fixed  and 
immutable  principles  .  .  .  neither  injuring  nor  injured  by  one 
another,  but  all  in  order  moving  according  to  reason.'^  That  is, 
there  is  a  dominating  conception  which  preserves  the  subordinate 
conceptions  in  their  ordered  harmony,  a  highest  rational  principle, 
the  condition  of  all  rationality ;  this  is  that  which  is  termed  the  idea 
of  the  good.  What  light  is  to  the  visible  object,  the  indispensable 
condition  and  cause  of  its  visibility,  so  the  idea  of  good,  being  abso- 
lute, is  the  principle  necessary  to  the  existence  of  all  knowledge  and 
truth.  It  is  absolute  science  itself,  attained  by  'dialectic,'  which  is 
the   culminating   abstraction   of   reason.      Conceptions    of   number, 

^  Book  VI.,  translated  by  B.  Jowett. 


C08M0L0GICAL  5 

harmony,  order,  may  be  said  to  be  contained  in  it,  for  they  are  sub- 
servient to  this  organizing  principle,  while  it  in  turn  is  the  primary 
condition  of  their  being.  Hence  the  importance  which  is  attached 
to  the  studies  of  number  and  calculation  in  the  Platonic  scheme  of 
knowledge.  Mathematical  conceptions  are  essentially  conceptions 
instrumental  to  fixedness  and  order;  they  maintain  diverse  elements 
within  their  respective  limits  and  thus  are  conducive  to  the  unity 
of  the  whole. 

Evinced  under  a  different  aspect,  but  corresponding  to  the  ideal 
good  in  the  'Republic,'^  is  the  supreme  principle  of  'measure'  in 
the  'Philebus.'  Plato  conceives  measure  as  the  principle  of  sym- 
metry, which  is  due  to  the  regulated  proportion  of  elements  in  com- 
bination, and  thus  may  be  identified  with  beauty.  The  first  rank  in 
the  scale  of  goods  is  assigned  to  measure.  For  the  greatest  good  in 
the  world  is  to  be  sought,  not  in  pleasure,  not  in  wisdom,  but  in  the 
*  mixture'  of  elements,  and  above  all  in  the  proportion  of  the  mix- 
ture. Measure  is  identical  with  the  principle  of  their  ordered  mix- 
ture. The  universe  is  an  embodiment  of  this  principle  of  measure, 
for  'there  is  in  the  universe  a  mighty  infinite  and  an  adequate 
limit,  as  well  as  a  cause  of  no  mean  power  which  orders  and  arranges 
years  and  seasons  and  months,  and  may  be  justly  called  wisdom  and 
mind.-'  This  infinite  factor  which  enters  into  the  composition  of 
the  cosmos  is  controlled  by  the  principle  of  measure  so  that  'the 
assertion  that  the  mind  orders  all  things  is  worthy  of  the  aspect  of 
the  world,  and  of  the  sun  and  of  the  moon  and  of  the  whole  circle 
of  the  heavens.' 

In  the  'Symposium'  the  supreme  principle  is  revealed  under  the 
guise  of  beauty.  The  object  of  all  love  or  impulse  is  the  beautiful, 
and  the  object  of  the  highest  passion  is  absolute  beauty,  the  prin- 
ciple of  all  concrete  beauties.  Beauty  is  the  result  and  the  condition 
of  the  harmonious  arrangement  of  constituents.  It  is  the  source  of 
the  balancing  influence  of  proportion ;  it  is  the  principle  of  harmony, 
of  order,  and  is  identical  with  the  ideal  good. 

In  Plato's  suggestion  of  a  probable  cosmological  theory,*  it  is 
plainly  evident  that  he  is  governed  by  the  necessity  of  giving  such 
an  explanation  of  the  origin  and  structure  of  the  world  as  will 
primarily  account  for  its  organized  character,  for  the  adjustment 
of  its  parts  to  a  consistent  whole.  This  universe  is  constructed  after 
the  eternal,  intelligible  pattern.  Harmony,  beauty,  order,  law,  must 
be  predicated  of  it.      Hence  a  'world  soul,'  or  supreme  organizing 

^  Books  VI.,  VII. 
2  '  Philebus.' 
'  Loc.  cit. 
*  *  Timaeus.* 


6  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

principle,  is  the  source  of  its  origination.  This  is  a  world  reason 
(vovs),  and  is  cognizable  to  reason  alone.  As  the  human  soul  directs 
the  movements  of  the  body,  so  this  world  soul  or  reason  controls  all 
occurrence  in  the  cosmos  and  is  the  final  cause  of  its  existence. 
Briefly,  the  intent  of  this  cosmological  theory  is  the  expression  of 
the  intelligibility  of  the  universe,  of  the  fact  that  it  presents  fea- 
tures which  manifest  a  general  subjection  to  regulation. 

To  recapitulate:  While  the   Platonic   dialogues  present  no   at- 
tempt at  a  systematic  world  theory,  the  general  theme  of  the  doctrine 
of  ideas,  as  indicated  above,  is  the  insistence  upon  the  recognition 
of  the  universal  prevalence  of  determination  of  all  things,  of  the 
existence  of  principles  regulating  becoming  or  occurrence.      These 
directing  principles  are  intelligible  and  immutable,  as  distinguished 
from  the  sensible   and   alterable.     They   in   turn   are   subordinate 
I     features  of  one  supreme  regulating  principle.      That  is,  the  world 
I    must  be  affirmed  a  system,  not  a  chaos;  there  is  a  controlling  ele- 
ment, perceptible  to  reason  alone,  obtaining  in  the  world  of  diversity, 
which  renders  it  a  unity,  an  organization.     Since  the  nature  of  the 
j    sensible  and  changeable  is  entirely  distinct  from  the  immutable,  this 
controlling  principle  in  a  sense  appears  to  be  outside  the  process  it 
dominates. 

Aristotle, '  in  his  inquiry  concerning  the  fundamental  nature  of 
reality,  recognizes  as  the  most  apparent  and  immediate  presentation 
of  experience  the  perpetual  change  of  sensible  things.  But  reflec- 
tion can  not  pause  at  this  incomplete  analysis.  Reality  is  not  a 
1  series  of  unrelated  particulars;  it  is  an  organic  unity  in  which  indi- 
j  viduals  function  uniquely  in  the  totality.  ''If  there  were  nothing 
besides  sensible  things,  there  would  be  no  principle  (apx^),  no  order 
(to^is),  no  generation  (ye»/€o-ts),  no  celestial  harmony."^  Science  is 
an  indubitable  possession  and  bears  witness  to  the  intelligible,  sys- 
tematic character  of  the  cosmos.  To  discover  the  ultimate  condition 
of  such  an  organic  unity,  to  demonstrate  the  existence  and  nature 
of  the  permanently  real  (owta),  which  is  implied  in  its  structure, 
is  the  problem  of  the  'Metaphysics.' 

The  primary  reality  (ovaria)  is  always  manifested  in  the  concrete 
individual  and  constitutes  its  essential  nature  (r6  tl  yv  elvai) .  On 
the  other  hand,  it  must  be  emphasized  that  an  adequate  conception 
of  the  essential  nature  of  a  thing  necessitates  a  transcendence  of 
any  particular  embodiment,  to  the  universal  character  manifested 
in  a  process  (kivt/o-cs).  Individuals  are  subject  to  production 
(yei/co-ts)  and  annihilation  ((f>6opd),  and  the  essential  nature  of  the 
individual    can    only    be    apprehended    under    genetic    conditions. 

^ '  Metaphysics,'  W.  Christ,  Ed.,  Book  A,  Chap.  10. 


COSMOLOGWAL  7 

What,  then,  is  generation  and  destruction,  what  are  the  character- 
istics of  a  process,  are  questions  which  must  be  considered. 

Every  concrete  individual  is  the  result  of  a  union  of  matter 
(vAr;)  and  form  (elSos).  Matter,  the  sum  of  conditions  necessary  to 
the  actuality  of  the  individual,  is  indeterminate.  Form  (elSos) 
is  that  which  defines  the  indeterminate  matter  {v\rj)  and  in  com- 
bination with  it  results  in  the  existence  of  the  concrete  individual 
(to  avvoXov).  All  existence  is  necessarily  individual.  Neither  mat- 
ter nor  form  can  originate,  nor  can  they  cease  to  exist;  the  pre- 
existenee  of  both  is  indispensable  to  the  realization  of  the  thing. 
It  is  the  concrete  individual  (  t6  avvoXov)  only,  that  which  is  com- 
posed of  both,  which  can  originate  and  perish.  Now  all  change 
implies  that  which  is  the  subject  of  change,  that  which  subsists 
during  differences,  that  which  is  permanent,— in  a  word,  matter 
(vXrj).  Matter  is  capable  of  being  both  of  two  contraries,  but  at 
different  times.  Thus  we  have  attained  the  conception  of  the  pri- 
mary real  (ovo-ta)  as  the  essential  nature  {r6  tl  rjv  ehai)  of  the  indi- 
vidual, which  is  only  manifested  in  a  process.  It  must  be  noted 
that  while  the  essential  nature  {r6  tl  rjv  clvat )  is  universal,  it  is 
embodied  in  the  particular;  while  it  is  static,  it  is  contained  in  the 
dynamic. 

Further,  movement  or  change  does  not  occur  indiscriminately, 
but  is  characterized  by  certain  limitations  evinced  in  its  operations. 
*' Nothing,  indeed,  is  moved  by  chance."^  This  is  the  import  of  the 
doctrine  of  potentiality  (Swa/xts)  and  actuality  (eWpycia),  which  is 
of  fundamental  significance  in  the  apprehension  of  reality.  Exist- 
ence may  be  either  potential  or  actual.  A  thing  is  said  to  exist 
potentially,  when  upon  the  event  of  certain  conditions  its  realization 
or  actual  existence  will  take  place.  Matter  {vXrj)  is  potentiality 
(Swa/Ais),  since  it  is  the  condition  of  the  actuality  (evc/ayeta)  of  a 
thing.  It  is  indeterminate  in  so  far  as  its  potential  existence  may 
or  may  not  be  transformed  into  actual  existence,  but  it  is  a  deter- 
mining factor  in  limiting  the  nature  of  the  actual  in  case  of  its 
realization.  Thus,  a  seed  is  a  plant  in  potentiality.  For  if  the  seed 
realizes  its  nature,  that  is,  if  appropriate  conditions  are  forthcoming, 
the  seed  must  develop  into  a  plant  and  into  nothing  but  a  plant. 
The  plant  in  relation  to  the  seed,  the  potential  (Svm/xts),  is  actuality 
(ivepyeua).  It  is  evident  that  actuality  (ivipyetxi)  must  be  prior  to 
potentiality.  For  while  the  seed,  from  which  the  specific  plant  is 
produced,  must  have  existed  prior  to  this  plant,  there  must  have 
existed  another  plant  prior  to  the  existence  of  the  seed,  from  which 
it  was  generated.  Thus  it  is  only  in  the  case  of  the  particular 
individual  that  the  potential  may  be  said  to  exist  previously  to 

*  Loc.  cit.,  Book  A,  Chap.  6. 


>j 


'  i 


8  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

the  actual.  Generically,  actuality  (eVcpyeta)  must  exist  prior  to 
potentiality  (Swa/xts),  prior  in  every  sense  of  the  term,  in  time,  in 
knowledge,  and  in  essence  (ovo-ta),  for  the  actual  must  always  define 
the  merely  potential. 

Aristotle  has  previously  predicated  the  eternal  character  of  move- 
ment, on  the  ground  that  if  movement  or  change  were  not  perpetual, 
something  would  have  to  be  produced  from  nothing,— which  is  in- 
conceivable. Linked  to  the  deduction  of  the  eternal  character  of 
movement  and  a  consequent  of  it,  is  the  affirmation  of  the  eternal 
character  of  time. 

With  the  establishment  of  the  conception  of  reality  as  a  per- 
petual process,  Aristotle  has  arrived  at  the  final  and  ultimate  stage 
of  the  inquiry:  What  is  the  fundamental  condition  of  such  a 
process?  What  is  the  final  cause  of  the  w^orld  order?  All  move- 
ment and  change  imply  that  which  is  capable  of  originating  move- 
ment, for  if  movement  were  not  produced  by  something  it  would 
have  to  arise  from  nothing.  This  cause  of  movement  must  exist  in 
operation  {hipytux.) ;  for  if  it  were  merely  capable  of  producing 
movement,  but  did  not  operate,  it  would  not  account  for  movement. 
It  must  not  contain  any  potentiality  (Swa/xis)  in  its  nature;  other- 
wise its  operation  would  not  necessarily  be  eternal.  'There  must, 
therefore,  be  a  principle,  whose  very  nature  (owta)  is  operation 
(cvcpycta),'^  and  which  must  be  without  matter,  since  it  is  eternal. 
Thus  far  we  have  derived  the  existence  of  something  which  is  moved, 
and  something  which  is  the  cause  of  movement.  But,  ''Since  there 
is  something  which  is  moved  (  to  KLvovfxevov)  and  something  which  pro- 
duces movement  (tokivoOv),  there  must  be  an  intermediate  term; 
that  is,  there  is  something  which  produces  movement  without  itself 
being  moved,  something  which  is  eternal,  and  both  existence 
(ovo-ta)  and  operation  (ivepyeui) ."^  Aristotle's  next  consideration  is 
the  nature  of  this  primary  reality  (ovo-ta),  this  eternal  first  mover, 
with  the  resulting  conclusion  that  it  is  reason  (vovs).  That  is,  this 
unmoved  mover  operates  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  in  which  the 
desirable  and  the  intelligible  cause  movement,  for  that  which  is 
desired  is  always  an  intelligible  object.  Again,  the  desirable  must 
be  identified  with  the  good,  for  we  always  desire  a  thing  because  it 
is  good,  and  do  not  deem  it  good  because  we  desire  it.  And  the 
principle  of  will  is,  therefore,  the  good  itself.  Now,  it  is  admitted 
that  the  best  thing  in  the  world  is  intelligence.  The  object  of 
intelligence  is  the  final  cause,  and  this  it  is  which  is  the  cause  of  all 
movement  and  determines  it  as  that  which  is  loved.  This  mode  of 
existence  is  life,  '  for  the  operation  of  intelligence  is  life  and  the  first 
**  Metaphysics,'  Book  A,  Chap.  6. 
^Loc.  cit.,  Book  A,  Chap.  7. 


C08M0L0GICAL  9 

reality  (ovo-ta ) . '  The  Deity  is  eternal  life.  Further,  what  must  be  the 
content  of  this  divine  thought?  If  this  supreme  intelligence  (voryo-t?) 
is  the  best  thing,  it  can  only  have  for  its  object  the  best;  but  the 
best  is  thought  itself,  therefore  it  must  think  itself.  Its  operation 
is  the  seizing  of  itself  by  itself  (voi;o-t9  votJo-cws),  self -contemplation. 

Thought  and  its  object  are  identical.  Nor  can  this  object  change, 
for,  being  the  best,  if  it  changed  it  would  cease  to  be  the  best.  It  is 
therefore  perpetual  self-contemplation.  This  mode  of  life,  which  is 
the  eternal  possession  of  the  divine  reason,  is  only  enjoyed  by  man 
in  rare  moments  of  speculative  thinking.  Since  all  things  in  the 
universe  exhibit  a  striving  for  realization,  a  tendency  toward  an 
end,  in  all  things  is  this  principle  immanent,  although  in  different 
degrees,  varying  from  the  lowest  type  of  existence,  that  of  inorganic 
being,  through  the  intermediate  phases  of  plant  and  animal  life, 
reaching  its  culmination  in  the  rational  life  of  man  and,  peculiarly, 
in  speculative  thinking. 

The  way  in  which  the  universe  contains  this  principle  is  com- 
parable to  the  relation  of  a  general  to  his  army,  or  to  the  organiza- 
tion of  a  well-regulated  household.  The  general  is  the  cause  of  the 
order  in  the  army,  and  the  principle  of  organization  is  the  condition 
of  the  regulation  of  the  household.  That  is,  the  universe  contains 
this  principle  as  the  cause  or  condition  of  its  unification.  For  while 
all  things  in  the  universe  exercise  their  distinctive  functions,  'all 
conspire  to  a  unique  result'^  The  self-realization  of  the  individual 
is  identical  with  the  process  of  the  whole. 

Gathering  up  the  results  of  the  whole  investigation,  the  essential 
points  of  interest  to  our  study  present  themselves  as  follows:  The 
preeminent  category  demanded  in  an  adequate  interpretation  of  the 
universe  is  that  of  a  world  reason  (vovs),  which  is  evoked  to  explain 
the  regulated  or  controlled  aspect  of  reality.  The  data  which  have 
led  to  this  induction,  also  the  particular  factors  which  the  argument 
finds  to  be  involved  in  the  category,  may  be  briefly  stated  as  follows  :>- 
Starting  with  the  admission  that  the  paramount  empirical  fact  of  ^ 
the  universe  is  change,  a  subsequent  observation  compels  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  the  existence  of  order  in  variation,  of  organic 
connection  between  events.  These  two  primary  assumptions,  change 
and  characteristic  alteration,  or  method,  lead  inevitably  to  the  con- 
ception of  reality  as  a  perpetual  process,  an  eternal  activity.  The 
question  then  resolves  into:  What  is  the  final  cause,  the  ultimate 
ground,  of  this  determinate  world  movement?  The  inquiry  dis- 
covers it  to  be :  The  continuous  operation  of  a  principle  which,  while 
itself  static,  controls  dynamic  nature.  Its  method  of  operating  is 
;similar  to  the  mode  in  which  the  object  of  desire,  the  intelligible 

^  Loc.  cit.,  Book  A,  Chap.  10. 


10  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

object,  determines  human  action;  it  influences  as  a  goal  to  be  at- 
tained, as  an  end  to  be  realized.  It  is  not  an  entity  coercing  from 
without,  but  is  contained  in  the  movement,  contained  peculiarly  as 
an  end  toward  which  it  tends,  as  an  attraction  to  which  it  is  impelled, 
as  a  result  for  which  it  is  making.  Now  all  individual  things  mani- 
fest a  tendency  toward  self-realization,  and  all  are  constituent 
elements  of  the  world  process.  The  whole  is  a  unity  of  its  move- 
ments. That  is,  the  determining  principle,  the  static,  universal 
element  of  reality,  is  identical  with  the  tendency  toward  self-realiza- 
tion essentially  characterizing  all  particular  existences.  ^ 

The  metaphysics  of  the  stoic  philosophy  proceeds  from  the  thesis 
that  reality  is  corporeal  in  nature  and  is  limited  to  sensible  existence. 
The  corporeal  must  be  defined  with  reference  to  a  dynamic  stand- 
point; force  or  tension  {rovos)  is  its  essential  character.  It  presents 
a  twofold  aspect:  the  real  is  that  which  acts  {to  irovovv),  and  that 
which  may  be  acted  upon  {rh  iracrxov).  Corresponding  to  this  double 
aspect  of  the  corporeal  there  exists  the  difference  of  finer  and  coai'ser 
in  its  nature.  The  finer  substance,  called  fire,  ether,  air,  atmos- 
pheric current  (Trvev/jia),  is  described  as  mind,  soul,  reason;  and  the 
coarser  is  termed  matter.  But  the  finer  is  conceived  as  everywhere 
interpenetrating  the  coarser,  and  hence  ultimately  must  be  viewed 
as  identical  with  it;  reason  is  in  all  things  and  inseparable  from 
them.  God  is  described  as  both  the  active  force  and  the  subject 
acted  upon,  or  these  looked  upon  in  union  with  each  other. 

The  world  must  be  considered  as  a  series  of  events  and  their  con- 
sequences bound  together  by  an  irresistible  necessity,  every  occur- 
rence of  which  is  in  conformity  with  this  necessary  order.  Hence, 
the  original  productive  force  is  called  a  'generative  reason'  (Aoyo? 
a-irepfULTiKos ) ,  for  it  contains  within  itself  the  ground  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  whole  world  into  its  ordered  multiplicity.  It  is  'a 
reasonable  God  or  an  artistic  fire  ( irvp  tcx^ikov)  ,  proceeding  accord- 
ing to  a  certain  method  to  the  production  of  the  world.  '^  The  fixed 
order  which  governs  the  course  of  events,  or  necessity,  is  denoted 
by  the  conception  of  destiny  or  fate  {elfjxipfxevr)) .  It  must  be  ob- 
served that  this  necessity  ruling  all  existence  is  no  transcendental 
principle  operating  from  without,  but,  consistent  with  the  stoic 
materialism,  is  inseparable  from  the  natural  force  and  must  be  iden- 
tified with  it. 

To  account  for  this  necessary  character  of  the  world  movement, 
for  the  universal  causal  series  of  events,  which  maintains  the  ele- 
ments of  the  world  in  perfect  balance,  and  is  thus  the  ground  of 
the  whole  order  and  unity,  the  conception  of  'Providence'  (Trpovoia) 

^H.  Diels,  'Doxographi  Graeci,'  Plac.  1.  7.  33,  p.  305. 


C08M0L0GICAL  H 

originated.  The  cause  of  this  destined  order  is  possessed  of  fore- 
sight of  everything.^  That  is,  with  the  view  to  the  end  to  be  at- 
tained, Providence  has  foreseen  and  foreordained  the  whole  process 
whose  method  is  comprehended  in  the  notion  of  destiny. 

The  perfection  of  the  world  system  is,   according  to  stoicism,   \ 
almost  too  obvious  to  be  in  need  of  supporting  arguments.     Among 
such,  however,  is  included  the  acknowledged  adaptation  of  life  to 
environment. 

The  summary  of  the  position  sketched  above  may  be  presented 
as  follows:  Stoicism  maintains  that  the  world  must  be  described  as 
a  fixed  order  of  events,  the  regulated  character  of  which  involves 
the  existence  of  a  guiding  principle,  whose  divination  of  the  end 
determines  the  character  of  the  process.  That  is,  supervening  upon 
the  conception  of  a  definite  movement  of  events,  there  is  the  concep- 
tion of  foreordained  control.  We  find  no  basis  for  this  idea  of 
predestination  other  than  the  existence  of  absolute  order,  perfection. 
A  preview  of  the  end  is  thought  requisite  to  control. 

The  period  dominated  mainly  by  scholastic  philosophy  had  little  \ 
need  to  occupy  itself  with  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  control.     Since  1 
it  was  accepted  as  certain,  upon  authority  superior  to  human  reason,   1 
that  the  world  was  the  creation  of  a  divine  spirit,  its  orderly  struc- 
ture presented  no  problem.     Since  the  ruler  of  the  universe  created 
and  directed  all  things  with  the  view  to  a  particular  end  to  be 
accomplished,  logical  effort  was  concerned  chiefly  with  the  task  of 
making  the  facts  of  nature  fit  in  this  revealed  truth,  rather  than 
with  the  search  for  truth  itself. 

Conspicuously  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  Spinoza  explicitly 
rejects  final  causes  on  the  ground  that  they  are  inapplicable  to 
reality.  The  philosophical  fallacy  of  referring  this  category  to 
the  universe  consists  not  merely  in  a  failure  to  denote  any  ultimate 
feature  of  the  world,  but  is  in  direct  conflict  with  the  fundamental 
position  upon  which  an  adequate  construction  must  rest. 

In  Part  I.  of  the  'Ethics'^  Spinoza  has  exposed  at  length  the 
origin  of  this  misconception  and  the  ground  of  its  falsity.  This 
is  effected  with  such  force  and  simplicity  that  I  venture  to  quote 
a  major  portion.  He  says:  ''All  such  opinions  spring  from  the 
notion  commonly  entertained  that  all  things  in  nature  act  as  men 
themselves  act,  namely,  with  an  end  in  view.  It  is  accepted  as 
certain  that  God  himself  directs  all  things  to  a  definite  goal.  ..." 
As  to  the  reason  why  men  are  so  prone  to  adopt  this  opinion,  he 
continues:  "It  ought  to  be  universally  admitted  that  all  men  are 

^Diog.  L.,  VII.,  149. 

2  Appendix,  translated  by  R.  H.  M.  Elwes. 


12  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

born  ignorant  of  the  causes  of  things,  that  all  have  the  desire  to 
seek  for  what  is  useful  to  them,  and  that  they  are  conscious  of  such 
desire.  Herefrom  it  follows  that  men  think  themselves  free  inas- 
much as  they  are  conscious  of  their  volitions  and  desires  and  never 
even  dream,  in  their  ignorance,  of  the  causes  which  have  disposed 
them  so  to  wish  and  desire.  Secondly,  that  men  do  all  things  for 
an  end,  namely,  for  that  which  is  useful  to  them,  and  which  they 
seek.  Thus  it  comes  to  pass  that  they  only  look  for  a  knowledge 
of  the  final  causes  of  events,  and  when  these  are  learned,  they  are 
content  as  having  no  cause  for  further  doubt.  If  they  can  not  learn 
such  causes  from  external  sources,  they  are  compelled  to  turn  to 
considering  themselves,  and  reflecting  what  end  would  have  induced 
them  personally  to  bring  about  the  given  event,  and  thus  they  neces- 
sarily judge  other  natures  by  their  own.  ...  As  they  look  upon 
things  as  means,  they  can  not  believe  them  to  be  self -created ;  but 
judging  from  the  means  which  they  are  accustomed  to  prepare  for 
themselves,  they  are  bound  to  believe  in  some  ruler  or  rulers  of  the 
universe  endowed  with  human  freedom,  who  have  arranged  and 
adapted  everything  for  human  use  .  .  .  but  in  their  endeavor  to 
show  that  nature  does  nothing  in  vain,  i.  e.,  nothing  which  is  useless 
to  man,  they  only  seem  to  have  demonstrated  that  nature,  the  gods, 
and  men  are  all  mad  together.'* 

In  essence  this  contention  asserts  in  the  first  instance  that  the 
ascription  of  final  causes  to  nature  is  an  anthropomorphic  procedure, 
a  projection  of  human  methods  of  activity  to  a  field  where  no  evi- 
dence for  such  methods  exists.  Moreover,  this  is  not  all.  The 
source  of  this  error  is  to  be  traced  to  a  total  misconception  of  the 
nature  of  human  volition.  For  that  which  constitutes  the  determin- 
ing cause  of  actions  is  not  a  definite  end,  in  the  sense  of  an  external 
goal,  but  directly  the  contrary  is  the  case;  the  controlling  cause  of 
action  is  embodied  in  the  impulse  which  leads  to  the  action.  **By 
the  end,  for  the  sake  of  which  we  do  something,  I  mean  an  impulse 
(appetitus) .^ ^^  Now  it  is  consciousness  of  this  impulse,  combined 
with  ignorance  of  the  efficient  cause  of  action,  which  gives  rise  to 
the  notion  of  freedom  in  the  sense  of  determination  by  an  inde- 
pendent end,  by  an  extraneous  agency.  Hence  the  conclusion  results 
that  final  cause  reduces  to  'nothing  else  but  human  desire,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  considered  as  the  origin  or  cause  of  anything. '^  Therefore, 
in  all  departments  of  nature,  human  as  well  as  non-human,  final 
cause  turns  out  to  be  a  *  mere  human  figment. ' 

To  disclose  the  ground  for  this  conclusion,  to  comprehend  the 
conception  which  must  replace  that  of  the  traditional  final  cause — 

» *  Ethics,'  Part  IV.,  Def.  7. 
'  Loc.  cit.,  Part  IV.,  preface. 


COSMOLOGICAL  13 

the  opinion  that  the  processes  of  nature  are  determined  by  an 
external  agency  acting  according  to  a  preconceived  end— against 
which  his  polemic  is  directed,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  Spinoza's 
metaphysical  theory. 

Efficient  causality,  universally  predicable  of  things,  is  the  initial 
presupposition  upon  which  any  attempt  to  comprehend  the  universe 
must  take  its  point  of  departure.  Organized  knowledge  exists,  and 
implies  the  dependence  of  everything  upon  some  other  thing.  In 
the  adaptations  of  individual  things  to  each  other,  expressed  in  the 
laws  of  nature,  is  presented  evidence  of  such  connection.^  This 
fundamental  premise  is  expressed  by  Spinoza  in  the  statement, 
' '  There  is  necessarily  for  each  individual  thing  a  cause  why  it  should 
exist."'  While  the  key  to  the  comprehension  of  this  regulated 
character  of  events  implied  in  universal  efficient  causation  is  dis- 
covered in  the  proposition,  "Nothing  in  the  universe  is  contingent, 
but  all  things  are  conditioned  to  exist  and  operate  in  a  particular 
manner  by  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature."  •' 

That  is,  this  determination  of  things  can  only  be  understood  on 
the  supposition  of  the  world  as  a  unitary  system  the  elements  of 
which  contribute  to  and  are  dominated  by  the  nature  of  the  whole, 
'the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature.'  The  individual  elements,  being 
determined  by  other  elements,  are  finite.  The  whole,  that  which 
can  have  no  external  determination,  is  independent.  Hence  the 
significance  of  'substance'  or  God  to  account  for  this  unity,  the 
whole.  "By  substance  I  mean  that  which  is  in  itself  and  is  con- 
ceived through  itself;  in  other  words,  that  of  which  a  conception 
can  be  formed  independently  of  any  other  conception."*  With  this 
conception  of  substance  established,  the  regulated  character  of  events 
is  to  be  comprehended  when  they  are  conceived  as  following  from 
the  nature  of  the  whole  by  an  inevitable  or  'geometrical  necessity.' 
In  Spinoza's  terminology,  "Individual  things  are  nothing  but  modi- 
fications of  the  attributes  of  God  or  modes  by  which  the  attributes 
of  God  are  expressed  in  a  fixed  and  definite  manner."^ 

But  this  whole,  this  unity,  is  a  whole  of  constituent  parts.  The 
controlling  principle  of  events  is  not  an  extraneous  agency  super- 
posed upon  them,  but  has  its  being  immanent  in  the  individual 
things.  Moreover,  according  to  Spinoza  it  is  this  very  factor  which 
constitutes  the  essential  nature  of  an  individual  thing.  Every  indi- 
vidual thing  is  composed  of  two  elements ;  of  the  finite  or  conditioned 

1  Letter  XXXII.,  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  Ed. 

2  *  Ethics,'  Part  I.,  Prop.  VIIL,  Def .  3. 

3  Loc.  cit.,  Part  I.,  Prop.  XXIX. 
*  Loc.  cit.,  Def.  3. 

5  Loc.  cit.,  Part  I.,  Prop.  XXIL,  Cor. 


J 


14  TEE    GOl^GEPT    OF   CONTROL 

and  of  the  necessary,  eternal  (out  of  time  relations).  In  so  far  as 
it  is  individual  and  a  member  of  the  temporal  series,  it  is  determined 
by  other  individuals  (by  transient  causes).^  Everything,  in  so  far 
as  its  essence  is  concerned,  is  eternal,  expressive  of  its  universal 
nature,  its  immanence  in  the  whole. 

This  essential,  universal,  static  nature  of  a  thing  is  expressed  in 
the  cotmtus  or  tendency  to  persist  in  existence.  For  it  must  be 
granted  that  all  things  manifest  this  striving  for  self -maintenance, 
this  principle  of  inertia.  ''Everything,  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  itself, 
endeavors  to  persist  in  its  own  being. '  '^ 

''The  endeavor  or  tendency  (conatus)  wherewith  everything  en- 
deavors to  persist  in  its  own  being  is  nothing  else  but  the  actual 
essence  of  the  thing  in  question."^  When  evinced  in  man  the 
conatus  or  tendency  toward  self-realization'  embraces  all  forms  of 
human  effort  and  is  called  impulse  (appetitus).  "Desire  {cupid- 
itas)  is  merely  impulse  (appetitus)  accompanied  by  the  conscious- 
ness thereof. '  '*  ^ 

Thus  it  is  shown  that  the  determinate  aspect  of  the  world  is  the 
result  of,  or  rather  is  identical  with,  that  characteristic  of  all  things 
which  is  designated  a  tendency  toward  self -maintenance,  self-realiza- 
tion. This  it  is  which  constitutes  the  static  element  in  the  temporal, 
finite  order.  This  it  is  the  function  of  reason  to  perceive,  while  to 
imagination  is  allotted  the  perception  of  things  in  their  spatial  and 
temporal  relations. 

Now  have  we  arrived  at  the  conception  which  must  replace  the 
rejected  final  cause,  whose  inconsistency  with  this  interpretation  of 
reality  is  clearly  apparent. 

Recapitulation.  The  presupposition  of  a  dynamic  world  de- 
scribed by  efficient  causality  necessitates  for  its  ultimate  compre- 
hension the  determination  of  all  events  or  objects.  The  guiding 
principle  of  the  cosmos  is  evinced  in  all  things  as  a  tendency  toward 
an  end.  The  end  can  not  be  conceived  as  an  external  goal,  but  must 
be  characterized  a  self-realization.  Otherwise  expressed— there  is 
in  everything  that  which  makes  for  what  is  beyond  itself,  but  is 
intended,  or  to  an  extent  involved,  in  its  present  existence.  It  is 
this  immanent  direction  of  change,  this  static  element  in  all  the 
variety  of  events,  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  controlled  aspect  of 
nature. 

To  Leibniz,^  imbued  as  he  was  with  the  results  of  modern  scien- 
tific investigation,  the  fundamental  philosophical  problem  presents 

^Loc.  cit.,  Part  III.,  Prop.  VI. 

'Loc.  cit.,  Part  III.,  Prop.  VII. 

*  Loc.  cit.,  Part  III.,  Prop.  IX.,  note. 


C08M0L0GICAL  15 

itself  as  the  necessity  for  showing  that  the  mechanical  conception  of 
cosmic  processes  requires  for  its  ultimate  comprehension  the  teleo- 
logical  view  of  nature.  Reason  can  recognize' no  infringement  upon 
the  universal  application  of  the  mechanical  theory  in  the  perceptible 
world,  the  world  of  matter  and  motion,  in  which  the  actions  and 
reactions  of  things  permit  formulation.  But  the  order  of  events 
so  described  is  not  ultimately  apprehended.  The  mechanical  con- 
ception of  nature  is  not  self-explaining,  but  demands  for  its  com- 
pletion a  further  interpretation.  Thus  Leibniz  asserts  that  he  has 
found  the  means  of  harmonizing  the  opposition  of  mechanical  and 
metaphysical  systems  in  his  discovery  'that  in  the  phenomena  of 
nature  everything  happens  mechanically  but  at  the  same  time  meta- 
physically, but  that  the  source  of  the  mechanical  is  in  the  meta- 
physical. ' 

The  perceptible  world  must  be  regarded  as  a  phenomenal  world, 
whose  inner  content  and  real  nature  must  be  conceived  as  force, 
activity,  life.  The  dynamic,  as  contrasted  with  the  static,  given  in 
physical  description,  constitutes  the  essential  nature  of  things.  And 
the  doctrine  of  the  'monads,'  which  Leibniz  has  advanced  to  the 
end  of  disclosing  the  ultimate  ground  of  the  phenomenal  world, 
is  a  theory  of  force,  activity.  In  anticipation  of  the  theory,  we 
may  note  that  the  notion  of  'force,'  'activity'  as  employed  by 
Leibniz  is  equivalent  to  self-originated  change,  and  that  in  essence 
the  monadology  may  be  interpreted  as  a  theory  of  regulated  move- 
ment or  change.  To  make  good  this  position  we  must  have  recourse 
to  the  doctrine  in  some  detail. 

The  ultimate  elements  of  things,  or  simple  substances,  are  units 
of  force  to  which  extension  does  not  pertain.  These  forces  or 
'monads'  are  the  real  atoms  of  nature,  and  are  original  and  inde- 
structible.^ Every  monad  is  an  individual,  is  distinct  from  all 
others,  and  is  incapable  of  being  influenced  by  anything  extraneous,^ 
'for  the  monads  have  no  windows  through  which  anything  could 
come  in  or  go  out.'  Extended  bodies  are  the  phenomenal  effects 
produced  by  aggregates  of  monads;  only  the  effects  of  force  are 
perceptible.  Now' all  created  beings,  and  consequently  the  monads, 
are  by  their  very  nature  subject  to  continuous  change.^  But  in 
addition  to  the  fact  of  change,  there  is  a  method  of  change,  that  is, 
a  principle  controlling  the  series  of  occurrences.*  "^  This  is  the  signif- 
icance of  denoting  the  monads  as  characterized  by  'perception'  and 
'  appetition. ' 

^  *  Monadology,'  §  1-7. 
'Loc.  cit.,  §2-9. 
» hoc.  cit.,  §  16. 
*  hoc.  cit.,  §  12. 


16  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

For  change  is  such  that  it  involves  an  unchanging  element,  a 
static  factor.  There  is  a  principle  of  unity,  of  connection,  in  the 
plurality  of  states  or  representations  of  the  monads  which  consti- 
tutes it  one  monad. '  Hence  force,  or  the  intensive  nature  of  things, 
manifests  itself  in  'perception.'  "The  passing  condition  which  in- 
volves and  represents  a  multiplicity  in  the  unity  or  in  the  simple 
substance  is  nothing  but  what  is  called  '  perception. '  '  '^  This  unify- 
ing principle  is  also  designated  '  representation, '  it  is  an  ideal  concep- 
tion; that  is,  it  is  no  phenomenon  divulged  in  the  material,  per- 
ceptible world  as  such,  but  rather  constitutes  an  intelligible  prin- 
ciple. Thus  every  monad  at  every  state  contains  the  whole  world 
in  the  sense  that  it  'mirroi^  the  world.' 

Further,  the  principle  of  change  is  determined  in  its  operations. 
There  is  a  particular  order  in  the  succession  of  states  of  the  ^monad. 
Force  is  evinced  in  ' appetition, '  'desire.'  ''The  activity  of  the  in- 
ternal principle  which  produces  change  or  passage  from  one  percep- 
tion to  another  may  be  called  appetition. '"'^  Now  this  determining 
principle  is  spontaneous,  for  the  monads  can  not  be  affected  from 
without.  "Each  carries  in  itself  the  law  of  the  continuation  of  the 
series  of  its  operations."^  This  self -active  principle  is  evinced  as  a 
tendency  to  pass  from  one  state  or  representation  to  another,  and 
this  tendency  is  directed  toward  the  self-development  of  each  monad. 
But  Leibniz  must  account  this  controlling  principle  in  each  monad 
as  oiie  principle  in  all  nature.  So  each  monad  is  potentially  the 
whole  universe  and  its  process  of  unfolding  its  inner  nature  is  iden- 
tical with  the  process  of  realizing  the  universe.  Appetition  ex- 
presses this  tendency  to  self-realization.  Since  each  monad  repre- 
sents the  same  universe,  its  differentiation  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
ix  is  a  particular  phase  of  representation,  a  particular  point  of  view ; 
that  is  to  say,  it  is  a  certain  degree  of  intensity  of  the  world  force. 

But  by  definition  the  monads  exclude  mutual  influence.  How- 
ever, the  material  world  to  be  interpreted  is  a  realm  where  recip- 
rocal interaction  is  the  law,  and  there  must  be  a  unity  as  the 
ground  of  the  whole.  Confronted  with  the  problem  of  explaining 
the  correspondence  in  the  functions  of  the  monads,  the  problem  of 
accounting  for  the  whole  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual, 
Leibniz  resorts  to  the  further  hypothesis'  of  a  'preestablished 
harmony.'  Each  monad  has  been  so  determined  originally  that 
spontaneous  activity  bears  the  character  of  a  part  in  a  whole.  Its 
natural  and  independent  development  appears  to  be  that  of  an 
element  in  a  system.     The  final  cause  or  origin  of  this  relation  of 

*  Loc.  dt.,  §  14. 
'  Loc.  dt.,  §  15. 
'  Letter  to  Arnauld,  1690,  Erdmann  Ed.,  p.  107. 


COSMOLOGWAL  17 

preestablished  harmony  is  an  uncreated  substance,  a  central  monad 
or  God.  ''God,  alone,  is  the  primary  unity  or  original  simple  sub- 
stance of  which  all. created  or  derivative  monads  are  products/'^ 

From  the  above  sketch,  we  conclude  that  the  import  of  Leibniz's 
teleological  conception  may  be  summarized  as  follows:  The  me- 
chanical theory  of  the  world  demands  for  its  ultimate  interpretation 
the  conception  of  reality  as  a  process,  a  specific  activity,  a  controlled 
change.  The  determination  of  the  course  of  events  is  inherent  in 
the  constituent  elements ;  it  is  manifested  as  a  tendency  in  all  things 
toward  a  result.  The  description  of  the  method  of  occurrence  as 
a  self-development  of  things,  as  an  unfolding  of  a  specific  content, 
is  a  mode  of  expressing  this  tendency  or  determinate  variation. 
The  function  of  the  doctrine  of  preestablished  harmony  is  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  identity  between  the  cosmic  principle  and  the  self- 
determination  of  individual  things. 

"With  the  theory  of  Leibniz  we  must  conclude  our  investigation 
of  the  cosmological  conception,  since  with  this  system  terminates 
any  extensive  interest  in  metaphysical  inquiry.  Henceforward 
philosophical  effort  is  influenced  by  the  problem  of  method,  and  the 
question  of  cosmical  control  is  either  totally  abandoned  or  relegated 
to  a  minor  position  in  systematic  thought. 

A  review  of  the  various  cosmological  conceptions  of  control  which 
have  been  presented  discloses  certain  salient  points  of  agreement.^ 
The  two  primary  assumptions  from  which  all  the  theories  take  their  ', 
point  of  departure  are,  first,  the  fact  of  a  dynamic  world  and,, 
secondly,  a  feature  which  is  not  so  readily  apparent  to  observation 
and  which  in  the  earlier  theories  is  indefinitely  designated  as  order,, 
regularity,  harmony,  etc.,  while  in  the  modern  accounts  it  is  more 
precisely  described  in  terms  of  efficient  causality  or  of  the  mechanical 
theory.     To  explain  this  characteristic  of  the  world  change  it  is 
deemed  necessary  to  conceive  nature  a  course  of  events  which  is  de- 
termined, in  a  word,  a  process.     The  requirements  of  logic  demand 
that  the  controlling  principle  be  contained  immanently  in  the  series— 
oToccurrences  w^hich  it  influences.     It  is  a  universal  in  the  particular 
elements7a  static  existence  in  the  dynamic  flux.     In  the  doctrines  of 
Aristotle,  Spinoza  and  Leibniz  (most  thoroughly  of  Spinoza)  there 
is   exposed  the  mode   in   which  this  principle   exists   as   a   factor 
'  immanent  in  the  w^orld  it  constitutes  a  process.     In  all  individuals 
is  it  manifested  as  a  tendency  to  something  beyond  immediate  exist- 

^  *  Monadology,'  §47. 


18  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

ence,  and  by  virtue  of  this  relation  effecting  conservation  gives  to 
what  would  otherwise  be  discrete  happenings  the  character  of  results. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  discovered  the  view,  peculiar  to  cer- 
tain theories  (Platonism,  stoicism,  scholasticism),  which  locates  the 
source  of  cosmic  control  in  an  external  principle.  In  stoicism  and 
scholasticism  this  foreign  agency  operates  by  means  of  a  precon- 
ceived end.  "^  The  justification  for  this  opinion  has  been  discussed. 


CHAPTER    II 


EPISTEMOLOGICAL 


Beginning  with  Locke,  with  whom  the  central  interest  of  phi- 
losophy is  transferred  to  epistemology,  conceptions  of  control  assume 
a  different  status.  Now  metaphysics  as  the  field  for  the  solution  of 
philosophical  problems  is  abandoned.  A  theory  of  knowledge  is  the 
only  road  to  the  desired  goal.  If  thought  would  be  purged  of  the 
inconsistencies  with  which  it  had  been  permeated  during  the  domin- 
ion of  scholasticism,  a  new  method  of  procedure  must  be  followed. 
An  inquiry  into  the  possibilities  and  limitations  of  knowledge  must 
prelude  a  search  for  truth.  With  the  rise  of  epistemology  and  its 
fundamental  assumption  of  dual  existences,  there  emerges  the  prob- 
lem of  explaining  the  principle  of  connection  at  the  ground  of  the 
world  order  from  this  altered  standpoint.  With  experience  and 
knowledge  conceived  as  a  relation  of  some  sort  between  a  psycho- 
logical or  mental  existence  on  the  one  hand  and  an  objective  or  cos- 
mic reality  on  the  other,  there  is  introduced  the  question  as  to  the 
locus  of  the  unifying  principle  and  its  consequent  characteristics. 
If  all  knowledge  is  ultimately  derived  from  sensations,  and  if  sensa- 
tions as  the  merely  particular  are  incapable  of  supplying  the  prin- 
ciple of  connection  involved  in  the  complexities  of  knowledge,  then 
mind,  a  subjective  activity,  must  in  some  way  be  the  source  of  the 
synthesis.  Thus  in  the  theories  of  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume  and 
Kant,  in  varying  degrees  and  modes  mind  is  held  to  furnish  the 
principle  of  control  underlying  the  world  system.  For  without  this 
principle  the  world  would  have  to  be  conceived  a  chaos. 

On  the  other  hand,  these  writers  also  display  an  interest  in  the 
teleological  conception  of  nature.  But  having  placed  control  in 
epistemology,  they  were  compelled,  in  the  consideration  of  design  in 
nature,  to  resort  to  speculative  accounts. 

Locke's  position  with  respect  to  the  source  of  unification  is  in- 
definite. Starting  from  the  initial  presupposition  that  the  objects  of 
knowledge  are  confined  to  ideas,  and  further  that  all  ideas  are  trace- 
able to  sensations  which  in  their  first  appearance  are  separate  or 
detached,  Locke  vibrates  between  an  internal  and  external  principle 
as  the  origin  of  their  combination  into  the  complexities  of  knowl- 
edge. Now  the  source  of  synthesis  is  attributed  to  the  operation  of 
a  subjective  activity,  mind.     Knowledge  is  defined  as  'the  perception 

19 


20  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

of  the  connection  and  agreement  or  disagreement  of  any  of  our 
ideas. '^  Again,  the  principle  of  combination  is  referred  to  an  ex- 
traneous, metaphysical  source  variously  denoted  as  substance,  the 
Deity,  nature,  when  knowledge  is  asserted  to  be  dependent  upon  the 
agreement  of  ideas  with  'things  without  the  mind/^  But  the  in- 
terpretation which  influenced  the  development  of  thought  imme- 
diately after  Locke  is  the  doctrine  that  the  subjective  activity  origi- 
nates the  arrangements  of  knowledge  out  of  sense-derived  ideas. 

When  Locke  comes  to  account  for  the  purposeful  aspect  of 
nature,  his  position  is  a  reconciliation  of  reason  and  theology  and 
inclines  to  the  deistic  conception  of  God  and  what  is  known  as  the 
physico-theological  argument  or  the  argument  from  design.  This 
view  maintains  that  there  is  a  mind  outside  of  nature,  an  intelligence 
and  will  directing  it  according  to  a  preconceived  plan.  According 
to  Locke,  the  existence  of  God,  a  supreme  will  and  intelligence,  is  an 
inference  based  upon  the  nature  of  the  world  and  of  ourselves.  Of 
our  own  existence  we  have  an  intuitive  knowledge,  and  of  things  a 
sensible  knowledge.  Locke  accepts  without  question  the  order  and 
regularity  apparent  in  the  world,  and  on  the  basis  of  the  contingency 
of  our  own  existence  infers  the  existence  of  God.  Thus,  the  argu- 
ment runs:  Since  our  own  minds  are  dependent  and  not  self -pro- 
duced, and  also  since  the  cause  of  all  things  can  not  be  lacking  in  any 
existing  quality,  this  supreme  cause  or  God  must  be  of  our  own 
nature,  mind  and  will.  As  to  just  what  the  significance  of  mind  is, 
Locke  is  not  clear;  what  is  made  evident  is  that  it  is  a  notion  sub- 
jectively derived  and  then  assumed  to  account  for  the  regulated 
character  of  external  nature. 

Berkeley,  developing  to  a  further  stage  Locke's  thesis  that  all 
knowledge  is  limited  to  ideas  derived  from  experience,  discards  sub- 
stance, which  Locke  had  retained  as  the  material  substratum  of 
ideas,  and  with  it  any  objective  principle  of  connection.  For  we 
possess  no  idea  of  unity,  but  only  a  *  notion'  of  the  same,  hence  there 
can  be  no  external  reality  corresponding  to  it.  The  corporeal  world 
is  in  this  way  reduced  to  a  system  of  ideas,  and  hence  for  Berkeley 
the  problem  of  its  purposive  character  presents  no  difficulties.  This 
system  of  ideas  constitutes  a  cosmos.  There  is  change  and  there  is 
order  of  succession  in  the  change.  Since  it  is  obvious  that  our  own 
minds  or  wills  do  not  control  these  ideas,  Berkeley  proceeds  to  infer 
the  existence  of  an  incorporeal  cause  or  spirit  as  the  author  of  the 
world  harmony.  What  are  known  as  laws  of  nature  are  really  laws 
of  this  spirit.     This  notion  of  a  supreme  mind  is  based  upon  the 

*  *  Essay,'  Book  IV.,  Chap.  I.,  Sec.  2. 
^Loc.  dt.,  Book  IV. 


EPI8TEM0L00ICAL  21 

doctrine  of  a  subjective  agent,  a  spiritual  entity  in  which  ideas  in- 
here, which  Berkeley  had  retained  when  rejecting  a  corporeal  sub- 
stance. 

Hume,  carrying  to  its  logical  outcome  the  thesis  that  all  ideas  are 
ultimately  traceable  to  sense  impressions,  finds  that  upon  this  basis 
there  can  exist  no  formative  principle  of  events,  no  essential  unity, 
no  real  knowledge  beyond  immediate  sensations  and  the  memory  of 
these. 

After  banishing  Locke's  material  substance,  Berkeley  had  still 
held  to  a  substantial,  spiritual  entity.  Advancing  a  step  farther 
along  the  same  line,^  Hume  shows  that  the  existence  of  mind,  a  sub- 
stantial unity,  is  an  untenable  hypothesis.^  For  no  impression  from 
which  this  idea  arises  can  be  discovered;  analysis  discloses  what  is 
designated  as  mind  to  be  a  mere  'bundle  of  perceptions,'  with  no 
principle  of  connection  to  constitute  a  unity.  Similarly,  necessary 
connection  as  an  essential  constituent  of  the  law  of  causality  turns 
out  upon  examination  to  be  a  mere  figment  of  the  imagination,  a 
gratuitous  construction,  with  no  basis  in  reality.  Experience  pre- 
sents elements  in  contiguity  and  succession,  but  perception  reveals 
no  idea  of  any  necessary  connection.  With  the  abolishment  of  any 
essential  synthesis  of  the  contents  of  ideas,  or  the  objects  of  knowl- 
edge, Hume  is  compelled  to  seek  elsewhere  for  the  explanation  of 
what  must  be  accorded  complexities  of  our  experiences  and  the 
apparent  order  and  uniformity  of  nature.  For  reflection  can  not 
conceive  experience  as  a  chaotic  jumble  of  elements  or  as  an  indis- 
criminate sequence  of  events. 

This  explanation  of  the  unity  prevailing  in  the  practical  world 
is  gained  by  reference  to  the  psychological  processes  of  association 
and  habit.  In  the  case  of  the  law  of  causality,  repetitions  of 
sequences  give  rise  to  the  feeling  of  necessity  that  upon  the  appear- 
ance of  one  event  a  particular  successor  will  follow.  Thus  necessity 
reduces  to  a  habit  of  human  nature,  a  tendency  of  the  mind  to  pass 
from  one  event  to  another,  but  indicates  no  connection  between  the 
events  themselves.  It  is  a  relation  between  ideas  as  psychical  exist- 
ences, not  as  contents  or  objects  of  knowledge.  No  real  consequence 
can  be  demonstrated;  arbitrary  sequence  is  all  that  can  be  asserted. 
Hume  stops  with  this  negative  conclusion ;  an  inquiry  into  the  logical 
ground  of  this  belief  in  necessity  does  not  suggest  itself. 

With  respect  to  the  teleological  conception  of  nature,  Hume  dis- 
cards the  compromise  between  science  and  religion  as  effected  by 
Locke  and  Berkeley.  From  the  standpoint  of  an  empirical  epis- 
temology  the  argument  for  design  can  not  be  maintained  on  rational 
grounds.      The  assertion  of  the  absolute  order  and  harmony  of  the 


22  TEE    CONCEPT    OF   CONTROL 

world  is  unwarranted  by  the  facts  of  experience.  Apart  from 
strictly  rational  considerations  Hume  does  find  that  the  view  of  a 
supreme  force  regulating  the  events  of  the  world  appears  to  be 
pertinent  to  nature. 

Kant's  position  is  fundamentally  influenced  by  the  acceptance  of 
the  two-world  theory  of  experience,  although  its  form  is  an  essential 
modification  of  any  hitherto  expounded.  In  accordance  with  Hume 
there  is  the  initial  assumption  of  an  external  reality  presented 
through  the  medium  of  sensation.  But  Hume's  consequent  conclu- 
sion, the  ultimate  reduction  of  all  knowledge  to  the  passive  flux  of 
isolated  sense  impressions,  can  not  be  accepted.  Our  experience  of 
objects  is  an  indubitable  fact,  knowledge  exists,  science  exists. 
Necessary  connection,  principles  of  unification,  synthetic  processes, 
not  only  do  take  place,  but  must  be  operative,  since  they  constitute 
the  very  conditions  of  knowledge.  Without  a  formative  principle 
no  object  of  knowledge  would  be  possible.  Since  this  synthesis, 
which  must  be  accorded  universal  and  necessary,  is  incapable  of 
being  derived  from  sensation,  marked  as  this  is  with  particularity  and 
contingency,  Kant  concludes  that  it  must  be  referred  to  the  activity 
^of  an  internal  subjective  element,  mind. 

External  reality  in  itself  can  never  be  an  object  of  knowledge. 
The  office  of  sensation  is  limited  to  furnishing  the  stimulus  which 
excites  the  formative  activity.  That  is,  by  means  of  sensations  is 
presented  the  raw  material,  absolutely  unformed,  upon  which  the 
shaping  process  operates,  and  wanting  which  it  can  not  be  effect- 
ive. Even  to  recognize  a  sensation  as  such  involves  relationship, 
synthesis.  To  determine  the  various  modes  of  synthesis  which  con- 
stitute the  objects  of  experience  and  which  are  the  preconditions  of 
all  science  is  the  task  of  the  ^  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. ' 

The  primary,  general  conditions  of  any  object  at  all  are  the 
forms  of  intuition,  space  and  time.  These  are  the  pure  forms  of 
perception,  the  manner  in  which  the  theoretical  reason  operates  to 
combine  the  manifold  of  sensation  into  perceptions. 

But  nature  is  not  a  mere  aggregate  of  perceptions.  The  existence 
of  any  particular  object  as  well  as  the  relation  of  objects  with  each 
other  involves  a  further  stage  of  synthesis.  Mere  flux,  alternations 
of  sensations,  could  never  result  in  an  object  or  knowledge.  For 
these  particulars  to  be  held  together,  an  abiding  element  is  required, 
a  principle  of  connection,  an  intelligence.  This  it  is  which  con- 
stitutes the  'ego,'  'the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception,'  'the 
self.'  That  faculty  whereby  the  creative  activity  combines  the 
elements  of  perception  into  the  complexities  of  the  world  of  experi- 
ences is  termed  the  'understanding.'     The  'pure  understanding'  sup- 


EPISTEMOLOGICAL  23 

plies  the  concepts  which  are  at  the  basis  of  those  relations  of  objects 
described  in  physical  science,  the  concepts  which  underlie  the  system 
of  the  world.  Thus  it  may  be  said  the  'understanding  prescribes 
laws  to  nature. '  The  objective  world  of  experience  is  a  phenomenal 
world,  a  construction  of  the  theoretical  reason. 

In  agreement  with  Hume,  Kant  denies  the  conception  of  design 
as  a  principle  implied  in  the  constitution  of  nature.  On  theoretical 
grounds  the  validity  of  the  deistic  conception  is  incapable  of  being 
established  upon  the  basis  of  the  nature  of  this  objective  world. 
But  as  a  regulative  conception,  as  a  principle  of  the  reflective 
reason,  Kant  finds  the  teleological  conception  useful  and  justifiable. 
That  is,  it  is  a  way  of  considering  things  which  the  mind  finds 
indispensable  to  a  complete  interpretation  of  the  world.  To  under- 
stand nature,  our  intelligence  must  view  it  as  if  it  were  regulated 
by  design.  Thus  the  conception  has  its  existence  only  in  the  mind, 
it  is  subjective  in  the  Kantian  sense. 

From  the  consideration  of  this  position  it  is  apparent  that  if  we 
would  determine  what  must  be  regarded  as  rationally  valid  in  the 
teleological  conception,  or  what  in  the  Kantian  philosophy  must  be 
deemed  a  principle  of  the  constitutive  reason,  the  query  which  will 
guide  us  resolves  itself  into.  What  are  those  features  inherent  in  the 
objective  world  (objective  in  the  Kantian  sense)  which  permit  and 
compel  this  way  of  viewing  things  if  they  would  be  comprehended? 

In  the  'Critique  of  Judgment'  Kant  analyzes  the  concept  of  pur- 
pose to  some  extent,  and  marks  the  distinction  between  Zweck  (end) 
and  Ziveckmdssigkeit  (adaptation  to  end,  or  purpose).  Zweck 
(end)  is  a  conception  which  contains  the  ground  of  the  activity  of 
an  object.  '^ Ziveckmdssigkeit  (purpose)  is  the  agreement  of  a  thing 
with  a  character  which  is  only  possible  in  accordance  with  ends.'' 

Kant  suggests  that  it  is  analogy  with  our  own  psychological  ac- 
tivity which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  conception.     Now,  in  two  in- 
stances is  there  presented  this  characteristic  which  must  be  regarded    . 
as  purposive;  in  the  unity  and  uniformity  of  the  world,  and  in    I 
organic  beings. 

In  order  that  the  world  may  be  known,  in  order  that  scientific' 
research  may  proceed,  it  is  necessary  to  conceive  nature  *  as  if  a 
reason  were  at  the  basis  of  the  unity  in  multiplicity  manifested  in 
her  empirical  laws.'^     That  is,    an   activity   analogous  to  human 
causality  is  postulated  to  render  intelligible  the  fact  of  control  which   ' 
is  implied  in  the  view  that  the  world  is  a  systematic  unity. 

Again,  organic  activity  must  be  regarded  as  regulated  with  refer- 
ence to  ends  since  the  parts  and  the  whole  in  organic  beings  can 

*  *  Critique  of  Judgment.' 


24  TEE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

not  be  understood  independently  of  each  other.  The  production  of 
the  whole  organism  is  determined  by  the  parts  and,  conversely,  the 
production  of  the  parts  is  influenced  by  each  other  and  by  the  whole. 
This  reciprocal  determination,  Kant  holds,  is  rendered  comprehen- 
sible only  on  the  supposition  of  an  intelligence  which  acts  as  if  it  had 
a  purpose  in  view. 

Consideration  of  both  these  instances  of  purposiveness,  the  unity 
of  the  cosmos  and  organic  products,  leads  us  to  conclude  that  that 
characteristic  which  is  allowed  to  be  an  essential  element  of  the  ob- 
jective world,  and  which  the  subjective  conception  is  evoked  to 
explain,  is  a  connection  of  dependence  among  elements,  such  a 
relation  of  particulars  as  is  conducive  to  a  definite  result.  What 
the  position  further  maintains  is,  that  to  comprehend  this  fact  it 
is  requisite  to  entertain  a  conception  analogous  to  psychological 
activity,  that  is,  a  determination  by  means  of  a  preconceived  idea. 
It  is  this  opinion  which  has  led  Kant  to  designate  the  conception  of 
purpose,  as  applied  to  the  world,  subjective.  What  the  above 
analysis  of  purpose  has  warranted  us  in  retaining  as  an  essential 
trait  of  the  world  is  the  fact  of  control  as  a  specific  relation  between 
events,  which  relation  is  the  ground  of  its  systematic  nature.  It 
must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  objective  world  according 
to  Kant  is  really  a  subjective  construction,  hence  this  determining 
element  in  nature  in  the  last  instance  is  the  work  of  mind. 

The  post-Kantian  idealistic  movement,  developed  in  the  systems 
of  Fichte,  Schelling  and  Hegel,  destroyed  the  transcendent  cosmic 
reality  which  Kant  had  maintained  as  the  cause  of  sensations,  the 
unknown  matter  which  was  indispensable  to  the  exercise  of  the 
activity  of  reason.  Hence  the  entire  phenomenal  world  is  referred 
to  consciousness  or  reason,  either  as  its  creation  or  as  existence  iden- 
tical with  it,  according  to  the  particular  view  of  consciousness  enter- 
tained. In  the  philosophy  of  Fichte,  the  transcendent  absolute  ego 
determines  itself  in  its  unconscious  creation  of  the  non-ego  or  ex- 
ternal object.  Control  of  the  object  becomes  a  determination  of 
self.  Schelling  conceives  both  ego  and  non-ego,  mind  and  nature, 
to  be  the  product  of  a  superior,  mysterious  transcendent  principle, 
the  identity  of  contraries.  Finally,  as  a  last  phase  of  this  movement, 
Hegel  asserts  that  neither  mind  nor  matter  is  transcendent ;  both  are 
simply  successive  stages  in  the  one  process  of  reality.  The  world 
of  experience  is  just  this  evolution  of  consciousness;  reason  is 
developing  reality.  Consciousness,  however,  is  not  identical  with 
any  human  faculty,  as  Kant  had  asserted  it  to  be,  but  constitutes  the 
law  of  all  being.  It  is  the  same  principle  which  legislates  in  both 
nature  and  mind,  although  conscious  of  itself  in  the  latter.     Thus 


EPI8TEM0L0GICAL  25 

does  the  principle  of  order  become  the  ground  of  the  objective,  the 
external,  which  it  determines ;  and  its  operation  is  the  affirmation  of 
the  other  and  the  subsequent  control  of  it  by  the  inclusion  of  its 
product  within  itself. 

Coming  down  to  the  present-day  philosophical  movement  known  , 
as  pragmatism,  we  find  a  fundamental  importance  attached  to  the  i\/ 
notion  of  control.  This  theory  advances  upon  the  presupposition 
that  reality  must  be  identified  with  experience,  and  that  experience 
is  dynamic  and  continuous  in  its  movement.  Moreover,  the  experi- 
ence pj;^ocess  is  not  adequately  described  as  a  mere  flux  of  the  given, 
an  aggregate  of  successive  events,  a  conjunction  of  accidentals.  The 
movement  is  an  evolution,  each  event  is  a  stage  in  a  process,  one 
occurrence  is  the  outcome  of  another;  that  is,  determination  and 
restraint  are  essential  characteristics  of  it.  The  urgency  of  recog- 
nizing and  accounting  for  control  is  manifested  in  the  fact  that  it 
has  given  rise  to  one  of  the  main  problems  of  pragmatic  epistemology, 
namely,  to  explain  the  determination  in  an  experience  process  with- 
out recourse  to  any  principle  extraneous  to  that  process.  Direction 
of  the  experience  movement  is  predicated,  and  the  element  which 
exercises  this  guiding  function  must,  according  to  the  basal  assump- 
tions, be  wholly  immanent.  Thus  experience  is  conceived  to  be  a 
self-evolymg  process,  a  self -mamtaLmmg  activity,  and  the  controlling 
factor  must  be  sought  within  these  limits.  Now,  that  element  which 
guides  activities  without  going  beyond  the  boundaries  of  experience  | 
is,  according  to  pragmatism,  knowledge.  Hence  knowledge  is  essen- 
tially an  instrument,  an  instrument  of  control  whose  office  is  the  f 
directing  of  the  movements  of  experience  in  so  far  as  these  are 
other  than  accidental.  Thought  is  one  among  other  functions  of 
experience  and  exhibits  its  peculiar  nature  in  determining  the  other 
characteristics.  It  follows  as  a  consequence  of  this  doctrine,  that 
irrespective  of  a  life  process  control  is  meaningless. 

In  order  to  determine  the  significance  of  control  in  this  theory, 
to  discover  just  how  thought  operates  as  control,  let  us  examine  the 
pragmatic  account  of  knowledge. 

It  is  maintained  that  since  knowledge  is  essentially  instrumental, 
a  function  in  the  process  of  experience,  the  consideration  of  its 
genesis    and    consequence    is    imperative    for    its    comprehension.        ; 
Thought  always  arises  in  a  situation  which  may  be  described  as  xy 
unsatisfactory,  the  elements  of  which  are  in  tension  one  with  another.  | 
In  order  that  activity  may  proceed,  a  reorganization  is  demanded. 
To  meet  this  want  the  idea  arises  as  an  interpretation  of  the  dis-  , 
crepant  situation,  as  a  defining  of  the  incompatible  elements.     Now 
it  is  the  very  essence  of  such  interpretation  to  lead  to  a  harmonious 


26  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

or  unified  experience.  For  in  making  explicit  the  end  which  must 
be  attained  if  activity  is  to  go  on,  there  is  involved  at  the  same 
time  the  tendency  toward  the  realization  of  the  goal  conceived,  the 
directing  of  activity  to  its  achievement/ 

Thus  we  obtain  the  thesis  that  the  idea,  being  primarily  a  plan 
of  action  or  purpose,  controls  movement,  in  its  quality  of  reference 
to  an  end.  The  idea  as  purpose  is  coincident  with  the  tendency 
toward  a  specific  future  experience  or  event,  as  contrasted  with  a 
mere  happening.  Control,  then,  reduces  to  a  relation  between  two 
events  of  experience  such  that  one  (the  idea)  brings  about  the 
existence  of  the  other  (a  fulfillment). 

In  this  description  of  the  thought  function  it  appears  that  there 
are  two  determining  circumstances  exclusive  of  knowledge.  The 
idea  itself  is  somehow  conditioned  by  the  antecedent  biological  situa- 
tion, and  the  experience,  which  is  the  outcome  of  the  purpose,  is 
likewise  dependent  upon  some  additional  fact  not  contained  in  the 
idea.  "The  conditions  out  of  which  the  idea  as  purpose  arises 
determine  also  the  fulfillment  possible. ' '  That  is,  the  idea  implies  a 
prior  fact,  transcendent  of  experience,  by  virtue  of  which  its 
character  is  determined.  And  again,  the  idea,  arising  in  this  man- 
ner, is  only  determinative,  and  constitutes  a  knowledge  if  it  issues 
in  a  completing,  satisfying  experience.  For  the  objective  is  such 
by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  controls.  Now  if  this  resulting  situation 
is  not  wholly  dependent  for  its  character  upon  the  idea,  it  is 
obviously  influenced  by  a  factor  independent  of  experience.  Since 
it  is  only  upon  the  actual  occurrence  of  the  anticipated  event  that 
the  idea  is  said  to  be  effective,  it  seems  that  knowledge  as  control  is 
itself  influenced  by  some  extraneous  element.  Just  what  part  this 
influence  plays,  its  relation  to  knowledge  as  control,  or  the  expres- 
sion of  any  implications  it  may  contain,  must  be  deferred  to  a  later 
stage  of  this  discussion. 

The  general  account  of  the  thought  process  sketched  above  em- 
braces all  varieties  of  knowledge,  both  the  critical  or  scientific  and 
the  barely  cognitive  processes.  Since  the  more  involved  operations 
may  include  and  emphasize  features  which  are  lacking  in  the  simpler 
cases,  it  would  facilitate  the  attempt  to  reveal  the  essential  character 
of  control  as  exercised  in  knowledge  if  attention  were  confined  to 
the  tjrpe  in  which  the  least  possible  degree  of  complexity  existed. 
Subsequent  consideration  of  the  more  involved  operations  would 
disclose  any  additional  characteristics  introduced. 

In  a  recent  article  by  Professor  Dewey  there  is  presented  an 
analytic  description  of  a  knowledge  as  such.^     In  this  account  the 

*  Gathered  from  '  Studies  in  Logical  Theory/  John  Dewey. 

2  *  The  Experimental  Theory  of  Knowledge,'  Mind,  N.  S.,  Vol.  XV.,  Xo.  59. 


EPI8TEM0L0GICAL  27 

distinction   between    a    cognitive   and   a   cagnitional  experience    is 
emphasized  and  their  differentiae  exposed. 

That  which  is  denominated  a  cognitive  thing  is  the  simplest  type 
of  a  knowledge.  Let  us  consider  the  concrete  case  cited  in  illustra- 
tion of  a  cognitive  experience:  a  smell  which  leads  to  action,  the 
plucking  of  a  rose.  The  experience  which  designates  this  sequence 
of  events  an  evolution,  the  final  act  a  result  of  the  first  occurrence, 
is  a  cognitive  experience.  Meaning,  *  intellectual  force  and  function' 
are  attributed  to  the  smell  by  virtue  of  its  relation  to  the  subsequent 
event,  the  presence  of  the  flower.  The  smell  means  the  flower.  Now 
it  is  important  to  lay  stress  upon  the  fact  that  it  is  only  retro- 
spectively or  a&  extra  that  meaning  or  purpose  is  attributed  to  the 
smell.  The  smell  in  its  original  existence  was  not  experienced  as  a 
smell,  was  not  an  idea,  but  mere  fact.  The  idea  knows  the  smell 
as  smell  because  it  is  related  to  some  other  thing,  the  flower.  With 
this  description  in  mind,  our  problem  takes  the  form  of  determining 
the  locus  of  the  controlling  principle  in  experience,  of  discovering  in 
just  w^hat  the  directing  function  inheres.  Undoubtedly  it  is  the 
cognitive  experience  (the  retrospective  experience)  which  affirms 
the  determining  relation  between  the  two  elements,  the  smell  mean- 
ing the  rose.  But  does  it  not  make  this  assertion,  is  it  not  a  knowl- 
edge, because  of  its  recognition  of  a  transitional  experience  inde- 
pendent of  the  knowledge  of  it?  The  controlling  element,  then, 
must  reside  in  the  immediate  transitional  experience,  the  connecting 
link  between  the  elements,  and  not  in  the  cognitive  experience. 
Knowledge  appears  to  be  grounded  in  control,  in  the  relation,  rather 
than  control  in  knowledge. 

Up  to  this  point,  then,  we  find  that  there  is  no  question  of 
thought  as  control.  The  instrumental  function  of  knowledge  is 
yet  to  be  evinced.  To  revert  to  the  illustration :  the  smell  recurring 
may  consciously  intend  the  flower,  may  'mean  to  mean'  a  certain 
terminating  experience.  This  'cognitional  experience  is  contempo- 
raneously aware  of  meaning  something  beyond  itself;  it  sets  up  an 
ideal  to  be  realized.  That  the  meaning  so  intended  is  actually 
effective  can  only  be  affirmed  after  the  resulting  experience  has 
verified  it.  When  so  validated  the  idea  is  held  to  be  true.  Accord- 
ing to  the  experimental  theory,  a  true  idea  is  one  whose  conscious  I 
intention  has  been  found  to  terminate  in  realization.  Our  query  now  m 
becomes,  Just  where  does  the  transformatory  or  reconstructive  func- 
tion of  thought  enter  in  this  second  type  of  a  knowledge?  The 
answer  is,  In  its  capacity  for  supplying  meanings  which  may  be 
purposeful.  This  it  is  able  to  do  because  of  its  predication  of  deter- 
minations w^hich  have  been  operative,  i.  e.,  because  of  a  previous 


28  TEE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

cognitive  experience.  Knowledge  serves  to  lend  direction  to  the 
process  of  experience  in  so  far  as  it  enters  into  the  intentional  pur- 
pose or  meaning.  The  content  of  a  cognitive  experience  may  be 
made,  consciously  made,  the  incitement  to  action,  and  is  thereby 
instrumental  in  determining  experience  to  the  extent  that  it  is 
capable  of  expressing  ideas  which  will  operate;  and  to  just  this 
degree  is  experience  *a  consciously  effected  evolution.'  That  an 
intended  purpose  will  be  effective  can  never  be  a  matter  of  certainty ; 
probability,  in  varying  degrees,  is  the  utmost  which  can  be  legiti- 
mately affirmed. 

As  a  result  of  this  analysis,  it  appears  that  knowledge  as  a 
knowledge  never  directly  controls  experience.  7  An  idea  in  function- 
ing presents  no  elements  which  can  be  distinguished  from  determina- 
tion in  experience,  which  was  unaccompanied  by  any  awareness  of 
its  constraining  nature.  As  an  impulse  to  a  specific  action  the  idea 
regulates  that  movement  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  of  any  non- 
logical  impulse.  In  a  secondary  sense  knowledge  may  be  said  to 
be  determinative  in  so  far  as  it  indirectly  influences  a  future  impetus 
to  action,  by  reason  of  its  capacity  for  supplying  the  content  of  ideas 
and  thus  modifying  impulse.  That  is,  knowledge  controls  in  so 
far  as  it  reflects  and  harmonizes  with  a  transcendent  determination. 
Experience  is  a  5e?/-determined  process  to  the  extent  that  there  is 
a  recognition  and  utilization  of  an  extraneous  control. 


CHAPTER   III 


BIOLOGICAL 


In  times  past  and  present  theories  of  vitalism  have  been  and  are 
asserted  which  claim  to  acconnt  for  certain  peculiarities  of  the 
organic  world  which  are  incapable  of  explanation  by  mechanical 
principles.  ^  While  the  formulations  of  the  theory  have  undergone 
modifications  with  the  development  of  biological  science,  the  logic  of 
the  argiiment  remains  generally  the  same.  Thus  in  earlier  times 
^  a  special  vital  force  was  presupposed  to  account  for  such  features 
as  the  orderly  structure  of  the  living  organism,  the  process  of 
development  and  the  adaptation  of  organ  to  function.  This  specific 
energy  constituted  something  supermechanical  in  nature,  not  sub- 
ject to  the  laws  of  matter  and  motion,  and,  according  to  certain 
formulations,  accomplished  its  work  through  a  preconceived  ideal.^ 

But  vitalistic  theories,  both  those  which  have  ceased  to  attribute 
a  human  intelligence  to  the  extramechanical  agent  and  the  earlier 
formulations,  are  prone  to  be  stigmatized  as  unscientific.  What, 
then,  is  the  ground  of  those  objections  which  regard  such  reasoning 
as  a  false  step  in  scientific  procedure?  The  import  of  these  criti- 
cisms, I  take  it,  may  be  stated  as  follows :  Vitalism  must  of  necessity 
be  worthless  as  a  means  of  explanation  since  its  method  of  procedure 
contains  within  it  an  inherent  inconsistency.  AVith  the  exposure  of 
this  inconsistency,  vitalism  as  a  scientific  theory  falls  to  the  ground. 
It  is  due  to  a  failure  to  appreciate  the  significance  of  mechanical 
explanation.  Let  it  be  granted  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  there 
are  distinguishing  organic  features,  such  as,  for  instance,  the  har- 
monious functioning  of  the  organism.  What'  vitalism  presupposes 
in  this  case  is  an  entity  to  account  for  such  an  arrangement  of  the 
material  constituents  as  induced  such  a  result.  That  is,  in  lieu  of 
the  forces  which  describe  physicochemical  processes,  it  asserts  a  prin- 
ciple which  it  holds  to  be  specifically  different,  but  which  actually 
is  assumed  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  the  same  function.'  Thus 
vitalism,  in  so  far  as  it  is  explanation,  resolves  into  mechanical 
explanation,  and  as  such  ceases  to  merit  attention  as  a  different 
method  of  interpretation,  but  must  stand  its  ground  similarly  with 
any  scientific  hypothesis. 

However,  if  vitalism  proves  superfluous  as  a  method  of  explana- 
tion, it  may  contribute  something  of  value  if  it  calls  attention  to  what 
have  been  considered  those  distinguishing  features  of  living  things 

29 


30  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

which  have  suggested  the  need  of  explanation  specifically  different 
from  that  obtaining  in  non-vital  nature.  If  the  development  of  bio- 
logical science,  with  its  increased  accuracy  in  the  description  of  vital 
processes,  has  tended  to  remove  the  ground  for  the  assertion  of 
peculiar  vital  characters,  yet  the  investigation  of  them  is  of  service 
in  the  present  study  since  it  has  been  conducive  to  the  analysis  of 
those  features  which  they  were  invoked  to  explain. 

Thus,  it  is  the  contention  of  a  modern  vitalist^  that  the  creative 
synthesis  of  the  organism,  its  harmonious  funct-ioning,  is  a  unique 
attribute  of  living  nature,  in  that  it  implies  the  possession  of  quali- 
ties by  the  whole  which  the  parts  do  not  display.  The  objector 
opposes,  and  we  must  add  justifiably  so,  that  this  constitutes  no  cri- 
terion of  difference  between  the  two  realms  of  nature.  Every  com- 
plex, inorganic  as  well  as  organic,  possesses  qualities  which  are 
wanting  in  its  constituent  elements.  The  attributes  of  water  are 
essentially  different  from  those  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen. 

The  subject  of  development  may  detain  us  somewhat  longer,  not 
because  it  requires  an  extramechanical  entity  to  render  it  compre- 
hensible, but  because  it  has  not  so  readily  been  paralleled  in  physico- 
chemical  description.  A  recent  statement  of  an  opinion  of  the  gen- 
eral drift  of  research  with  respect  to  this  subject  may  help  to  dis- 
close the  nature  of  those  facts  of  which  theories  of  development  must 
take  account.  To  quote:  "  The  germ  consists  of  two  elements,  one 
of  which  undergoes  a  development  that  is  essentially  epigenetic, 
while  the  other  represents  an  original  controlling  and  determining 
element.  The  first  is  represented  by  the  protoplasm  of  the  egg. 
The  second  is  the  nucleus,  which,  as  I  have  attempted  to  show,  must 
apparently  be  conceived  as  a  kind  of  microcosm  or  original  preforma- 
tion consisting  of  elements  which  correspond,  each  for  each,  to 
particular  facts  of  characters  of  the  future  organism."- 

We  are  not  here  concerned  with  the  problem  as  to  whether  epi- 
genesis  or  preformation  or  both  be  the  proper  explanation  of  develop- 
ment. What  is  to  be  observed  is,  that  all  the  theories  are  advanced 
to  account  for  a  particular  series  of  events,  such  a  series  as  must  be 
described  as  a  process  of  development.  That  is,  these  theories  indi- 
cate the  necessity  of  explaining  mechanically  (i.  e.,  in  terms  of 
matter  and  motion)  what  must  otherwise  be  conceived  as  a  process 
controlled  and  determined.  The  future  organism  is  somehow  the 
resultant  of  original  elements.  There  is  an  identical  factor  in  the 
individual  stages  which  constitutes  them  a  connected  series.  Should 
development  take  place  by  the  addition  of  parts  (epigenesis),  yet 
each  stage  of  growth  is  not  merely  new,  not  absolutely  unrelated  to 

*  Driesch. 

'E.  B.  Wilson,  'The  Problem  of  Development,'  Science,  February,  1905. 


BIOLOGICAL  31 

the  foreg:oin^,  since  this  new  must  be  looked  upon  as  conditioned  to 
some  extent  by  the  prior  stage;  thus  the  changing  series  of  states  is 
designated  an  evolution. 

If  it  prove  that  development  is  capable  of  analogy  in  inorganic 
nature,  the  fact  of  development  remains  unaltered  and,  if  the  above 
conception  be  sound,  must  stand. 

But  it  is  primarily  in  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of 
adaptation  that  biology  has  emphasized  its  peculiar  need  for  the 
emplojanent  of  the  conception  of  purpose.  To  the  recognition  of  this 
peculiarity  (Avhatever  its  nature  may  turn  out  to  be)  may  be  traced 
the  impetus  which  leads  writers  on  natural  theology  to  employ  it 
as  a  basis  for  the  'argument  for  design.'  When  Paley  compares  the 
eye  to  a  human  contrivance,  it  is  its  adaptation,  its  capacity  for  see- 
ing, that  makes  the  analogy  hold.  Its  structure  is  an  adjustment  to 
a  specific  environment. 

For  a  profoundly  suggestive  philosophical  treatment  of  this  sub- 
ject, I  refer  to  the  volume  of  Professor  Brooks.^  In  it  the  author 
contends  that  the  distinction  between  the  works  of  non-vital  nature 
and  those  of  life  is  useful  and  justifiable,  and  finds  that  distinctive 
character  to  be  expressed  by  such  terms  as  fitness,  use,  adjustment, 
adaptation. 

To  quote:  ''Living  things  are  preeminently  distinguished  by 
what  is  best  expressed  by  the  word  fi(i^ess ;  they  are  adjusted  to  the 
world  around  them  in  such  a  way  as  to  force  us  to  believe  that  the 
use  to  which  their  organization  is  put  has  in  some  way  been  the 
controlling  factor  of  their  organization."  Darwin  has  described  the 
method  according  to  which  adaptation  has  arisen,  when  he  expounded 
his  theory  of  the  origin  of  species  by  means  of  natural  selection. 
But  in  presenting  this  mechanical  explanation  of  adaptation  he  has 
not  disposed  of  fitness,  and  this  is  the  fact  to  be  interpreted. 

Now  fitness  must  be  apprehended  as  a  relation,  a  relation  between 
the  responsive  organism  and  external  nature,  such  as  tends  to  preser- 
vation. And  it  must  be  observed  that  it  is  not  primarily  the  indi- 
vidual that  exhibits  the  favorable  response  which  is  benefited  by  it, 
nor  primarily  the  organism  in  which  the  adjustment  manifests  itself 
which  is  preserved  from  injury  or  destruction;  but  otherwise.  The 
impulse  which  leads  to  reproduction  and  achieves  its  end,  the  perpet- 
uation of  the  species,  frequently  does  so  at  the  expense  of  the 
parents'  life.  To  cite  one  among  numerous  concrete  cases  of  migra- 
tion, we  may  refer  to  the  salmon.  In  the  prime  of  its  strength  it 
leaves  its  abode  in  the  ocean  and,  struggling  against  almost  insuper- 
able obstacles,  finally  arrives  at  the  mountain  stream  which  is  to 

^  *  The  Foundations  of  Zoology.' 


32  THE    CONCEPT   OF    CONTROL 

serve  as  the  breeding-ground.  There,  having  accomplished  its  end, 
the  establishment  of  offspring,  its  life  is  done.  Nor  does  this  present 
anything  anomalous  in  living  nature.  Thus  it  is  maintained:  "In 
all  cases,  the  structure,  habits,  instincts  and  faculties  of  living 
things,  from  the  upward  growth  of  the  plumule  of  the  sprouting 
seed  to  the  moral  sense  of  man,  are  primarily  for  the  good  of  other 
beings  than  the  ones  that  manifest  them. '  '^ 

And  here  we  are  confronted  with  an  important  point.  Fitness 
involves  the  continued  existence  of  that  which  is  fit.  If  the  being 
which  survived  the  favorable  response  were  not  in  some  sense  iden- 
tical with  the  one  which  manifested  the  useful  quality,  there  could 
be  no  such  thing  as  adaptation.  Since,  as  stated  above,  the  indi- 
vidual whose  survival  is  due  to  a  favorable  attribute  is  frequently 
other  than  the  one  possessing  the  useful  quality,  in  what  does  this 
identity  reside?  Evidently*,  in  the  species.  The  relationship  of 
adjustment  is  exhibited  in  the  series  of  individuals,  but  not  in  any 
single  individual  of  the  series.  Similarly,  when  we  predicate  fitness 
of  an  individual  organism,  the  continuity  inheres  in  the  variety  of 
changing  instances  of  the  individual  life,  and  in  particular  cases 
underlies  what  is  known  as  personal  identity.  That  is,  fitness  in- 
volves genetic  continuity,  a  permanent  factor,  an  intelligible  prin- 
ciple in  the  history  of  living  beings. 

Should  the  particular  means  by  which  species  have  been  brought 
about  prove  to  be  'mutation  (the  sudden  and  spontaneous  production 
of  new  forms  from  the  old  stock)  '^  or  the  gradual  accumulation  of 
iluctuating  variations,  the  above  position  is  unaffected.  Both 
theories  endeavor  to  account  for  adaptation^  and  what  it  implies, 
progressive  evolution  in  the  organic  world,  a  process  wherein  only 
the  survivals  count ;  these  accumulating  in  the  course  of  its  procedure 
constitute  a  history  in  living  nature. 

The  fact  that  change  in  living  nature  must  be  conceived  to  take 
place  under  certain  limitations  constitutes  the  foundation  of  the 
problem  of  heredity.  ^  A  theory  of  evolution  must  explain  two  classes 
of  facts,  first,  the  production  of  new  forms  of  life,  and,  secondly  and 
primarily,  the  repetition  and  preservation  of  type.^  The  particular 
means  by  which  heredity  is  effected  appears  to  be  an  unsettled  ques- 
tion of  biology.  It  is  held,  on  the  one  hand,  that  it  is  impossible  to 
explain  the  repetition  of  ancestral  form  on  the  theory  of  the  inherit- 
ance of  individual  adaptation  to  environment ;  and  again,  it  is  main- 
tained by  some  scientists  that  natural  selection  is  inadequate  to  ex- 
plain the  whole  phenomenon.     What  this  moot  position  does  indicate 

^  hoc.  cit. 

^  De  Vries. 

'  Adaptation  has  been  used  to  signify  favorable  variation. 


BIOLOGICAL  33 

is  the  fact  that  all  the  theories  of  heredity  find  it  necessary  to  explain 
the  conservation  of  type,  the  fact  that  the  new  in  livino:  nature  is  not 
entirely  new,  but  is  a  transformation  of  the  old. 

To  sum  up  the  results  of  the  discussion :  There  is  in  livinf?  nature 
that  which  must  be  conceived  as  a  tendency  toward  the  attairmient 
of  something  beyond  the  present  individual's  existence.  This  tend- 
ency, involving  a  permanent  element  in  a  changing  series,  makes  for 
accumulation,  thus  resolving  the  succession  into  a  history.  Other- 
wise stated,  there  as  a  principle  of  control  at  the  basis  of  the  organic 
world  which  gives  it  the  character  of  a  progress  or  evolution.  Or- 
ganic evolution  is  an  indication  of  a  determining  factor  since  it 
involves  conservation  or  limiting  conditions  of  occurrence. 


CHAPTER    IV 


MECHANISM 


The  modern  scientific  view  of  nature  repeats  the  observation  of 
peraclitus  of  old,— all  things  change.  But  that  the  flux  is  calcu- 
iable,  that  happenings  take  place  in  such  a  way  that  prediction  of 
/them  is  to  an  extent  possible,  that  laws  of  change  may  be  formulated, 
/these  facts  constitute  the  very  foundation  of  physical  theory. 
Mechanism  is  the  scheme  for  describing  and  explaining  physical 
processes,  and  the  existence  of  the  mechanical  theory  of  nature  pre- 
supposes and  involves  a  certain  determination  of  occurrence,  a 
regulation  in  change.  In  fact,  mechanism  is  in  essence  a  detailed 
expression  of  control.  The  fundamental  postulate,  upon  which 
science  advances,  is  that  there  is  some  constant  amid  all  variation. 
For  did  mere  change,  unrelated  elements,  embrace  the  whole  of  the 
physical  world,  science  would  be  impossible.  Did  observation  dis- 
close nothing  permanent  in  alteration,  laws  of  nature  could  not  be 
constructed.  Scientific  investigation  no  less  than  ordinary  observa- 
tion asserts  the  interdependence  of  phenomena,  and  natural  laws  are 
formulated  to  describe  these  connections. 

Let  us  see  how  physical  science  conceives  control  (tacitly,  if  not 
explicitly),  and  to  this  end  examine  some  of  the  actual  constructions 
as  embodied  in  its  basal  concepts  and  principles.  Before  entering 
into  this,  however,'^ since  the  object  of  physical  theory  generally  is 
the  formulation  of  laws,  it  is  pertinent  to  inquire,  What  is  the 
significance  of  a  natural  law? 

Modern  writers  on  the  logic  of  science  have  called  attention  to 
the  economical  and  practical  character  of  natural  laws.  As  an 
abridged  statement,  a  concise  arrangement  of  a  large  number  of 
facts,  a  law  facilitates  thought  in  its  endeavor  to  attain  a  compre- 
hensive grasp  of  things.  The  data  of  which  a  law  is  an  abstract 
formula  are  relations  which  obtain  between  elements  or  groups  of 
elements.  Observation  discovers  particular  sequences  of  happen- 
ings, and  a  law  in  its  descriptive  quality  resumes  these  sequences  in  a 
simple  formula.  In  order  that  such  a  resume  may  be  effected,  there 
must  have  existed  as  a  prerequisite  repetitions  of  similarities  in  the 
phenomena  observed.  That  is,  there  is  a  constant  factor  in  the 
variety  of  particular  sequences  and  it  is  this  identical  feature  which 
a  law  enunciates  and  which  constitutes  a  specific  relation. 

It  is  obvious  that  a  relation  of  succession,  the  outcome  of  empir- 

34 


MECHANISM  35 

ieal  data,  does  not  exhaust  the  character  of  a  law.  A  law  implies 
such  a  sequence  to  be  a  consequence.  The  later  happening  is  viewed 
as  a  result  of  a  previous  occurrence,  and  this  in  turn  is  regarded  as  a 
determining  condition  of  the  subsequent  event.  Otherwise  stated, 
a  law  formulates  a  specific  method  of  change.  To  this !> rope rty  of 
expressing  a  determining  principle,  the  practical  nature  of  a  law 
may  be  traced.  Thus  one  writer  defines  a  law  *  as  a  constant  relation 
between  the  phenomena  of  to-day  and  those  of  to-morrow.'^  Not 
only  a  past  order  is  described,  but  prediction  of  future  events  may; 
be  made  with  confidence,  and  all  such  prophecy  has  its  ground  in  the 
principle  of  uniformity.  For  every  law  is  a  generalization  and  as 
such  involves  the  postulate  of  uniformity,  and  uniformity  is  simply 
an  expression  of  the  logical  necessity  for  predicating  control  in  the 
processes  of  nature.  -^ 

It  has  been  said  that  science  makes  legitimate  prediction  possible, 
and  experience  in  the  past  has  served  to  justify  such  prophecy. 
Now  we  have  observed  that  all  statements  with  regard  to  the  future 
have  their  basis  in  the  postulate  of  uniformity,  and  the  question 
arises.  What  is  the  foundation  of  this  conception?-'  Is  there,  as  it 
has  sometimes  been  affirmed,  any  proof  of  the  view  that  no  arbitrary 
change  can  take  place  in  nature?  The  answer  to  this  query  leads 
us  to  speak  of  the  theory  of  probability  and  the  part  it  plays  (more 
or  less  consciously)  in  physical  induction. 

Of  a  future  event  there  can  be  no  certain  knowledge ;  nor  are  we 
consigned  to  absolute  ignorance  in  this  regard.  Probability,  a  degree 
of  knowledge  or  ignorance,  is  our  portion  and  constitutes  the  basis 
and  outcome  of  all  research.  Now  every  statement  of  probability 
in  physical  science  is  based  upon  an  hypothesis,  upon  the  conviction 
of  continuity  in  the  processes  of  nature.  Without  this  assumption 
no  inference  as  to  the  probability  of  occurrence  would  be  possible. 
Granting  this  thesis,  we  have  now  to  consider  the  view  which  main- 
tains that  uniformity  is  not  merely  an  assumption  indispensable  for 
scientific  constructions,  not  solely  a  conviction  necessary  for  practise, 
but  that  this  concept  has  also  a  demonstrable  foundation  in  experi- 
ence. 

The  probability  of  an  event  is  defined  as  the  ratio  between  the 
number  of  favorable  cases  and  the  whole  number  of  equally  possible 
cases.  It  is  important  to  note  that  in  this  definition  the  latter  clause, 
the  whole  number  of  equally  possible  cases,  is  itself  an  expression 
of  probability.  And,  consequently,  if  any  specific  probability  is  to 
be  entirely  a  matter  of  experiment,  the  basis  for  the  statement 
respecting  the  equal  possibility  of  the  total  number  of  cases  must 

*  Poincare,  '  Science  and  Hypothesis.' 


36  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

be  disclosed.     The  argrament  which  claims  to  demonstrate  uniformity 
by  means  of  the  calculus  of  probability  may  be  briefly  set  forth  as 
follows :   Cases  of  non-uniformity  have  either  never   occurred   or, 
I  admitting  their  existence,  their  number  has  been  relatively  so  small 
I  as  to  be  negligible  in  the  argument.     That  is,  the  number  of  cases 
favorable  to  uniformity  has  been  practically  coextensive  with  experi- 
i  ence.     We  come  now  to  the  second  term  of  the  ratio,  the  number  of 
I  equally  possible  cases  of  uniformity.     Whence  does  experience  derive 
its  knowledge  of  these  ?     The  answer  to  this  point  forms  the  crux  of 
the  argument.     Karl  Pearson^  proceeds  upon  the  basis  of  Laplace's 
theory  that  *in  cases  where  we  are  ignorant  of  the  condition  of  the 
possible  cases,  there  in  the  long  run  all  constitutions  will  be  found 
to  be  equally  probable.'     Then,  comparing  the  number  of  favorable 
cases  with  the  number  of  equally  possible  cases,  we  obtain  that  high 
degree  of  probability  of  uniformity  which  amounts  to  practical 
certainty.     A  little  attention  to  the  thesis  of  Laplace  discovers  that 
it  simply  begs  the  question  Avhich  is  the  subject  of  proof.     By  what 
train  of  reasoning  is  the  fact  established  that  all  constitutions  are 
found  to  be  equally  probable  in  cases  where  we  are  ignorant  1     Is  it 
not  obvious  that  this  theory  is  derived  by  means  of  that  very  cal- 
culus of  probability,  with  its  implied  assumption  as  to  knowledge 
of  the  equal  possibility  of  all  the  cases,  which  it  is  pretending  to 
demonstrate?     That  is,^this  proof  of  uniformity  is  based  upon  the 
postulate  of  some  principle  controlling  occurrence,- and  hence  the 
argument  for  its  experimental  basis  falls  to  the  ground.     Similarly 
it  will  be  found  that  those  theories  which  profess  to  explain  the 
constitution  of  an  ordered  world  upon  a  basis  of  pure  chance  always 
employ  tacitly,  if  not  openly,  some  principle  of  determination  upon 
I  which  the  force  of  the  demonstration  depends.     Control  is  a  postu- 
!  late  logically  necessary  to  the  existence  of  order,  but  is  never  merely 
I  a  result  of  physical  induction. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  some  of  the  constructions  of  physical  science. 
Mechanical  theory  was  wont  to  describe  phenomena  in  terms  of 
matter  and  motion.  These  two  ultimate  conceptions  were  specific 
designations  of  the  permanent  and  the  changing,  the  two  irreducible 
facts  involved  in  all  the  complexities  of  physical  science.  With  the 
development  of  physical  science,  the  concept  of  matter  has  under- 
gone modifications  in  order  to  comply  with  an  increasing  accuracy 
and  refinement  of  description;  but  throughout  the  whole  variety  of 
postulates  we  find  an  adherence  to  the  notion  of  the  permanent. 
Thus  in  an  early  stage  of  its  history  matter  was  defined  as  an  entity 
qualified  by  existence  in  space  and  time.     When  a  later  concep- 

^ '  The  Grammar  of  Science.' 


MECHANISM  37 

tion  replaced  these  Characteristics  by  the  trait  of  impenetrability,  it 
responded  to  the  same  general  need,  the  expression  of  indestruc- 
tibility. A  subsequent  physics,  finding  this  matter  too  gross  for  its 
requirements,  proceeded  to  break  it  up  successively  into  atoms,  prime 
atoms,  ions,  etc.  Despite  the  abandonment  of  spatial  and  temporal 
properties,  the  notion  of  the  unchangeable  is  retained.  The  atoms 
were  defined  as  indecomposable  particles  whose  only  motion  is  that 
of  translation.  Strain  and  rotation,  changes  in  its  internal  nature, 
can  not  be  ascribed  to  them.  If  the  ion  supersede  the  atom  as  the 
ultimate  element,  it  is  called  forth  to  serve  the  same  function,  which 
is  identical  in  all  these  conceptions  and  consists  in  the  expression  of 
the  fact  of  inertia. 

In  its  first  significance,  motion  designated  change  in  matter  as 
extensive.  This  concept  gave  way  to  force,  an  entity  to  express  the 
cause  of  motion,  while  in  the  science  of  to-day  force  is  conceived  as 
a  ratio  of  acceleration,  and  this  means  a  specific  description  of 
variation.  Thus  these  various  conceptions  of  motion  are  shown  to 
be  diverse  modes,  more  or  less  adequate,  of  indicating  change. 

Finally ,''^  in^  the  widest  generalization  of  physical  science,  the 
principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  there  are  embraced  facts  both 
of  fixity  and  of  change  f"  and  upon  ultimate  analysis  this  principle  of 
energy  reduces  to  the  assertion  that  there  exists  a  certain  identical 
element  throughout  physical  processes,  a  limiting  factor  in  change. 

Mach  says:^  ''If  we  estimate  every  change  of  physical  condition 
by  the  mechanical  work  which  can  be  performed  upon  the  disappear- 
ance of  that  condition,  and  call  this  measure  energy,  then  we  can 
measure  all  physical  changes  of  condition,  no  matter  how  different 
they  may  be,  with  the  same  common  measure  and  say:  The  sum 
total  of  all  energy  remains  constant.^*  We  look  in  vain  in  the  text- 
books for  a  definition  of  energy.  But  we  learn  from  such  state- 
ments as  the  above  that  energy  is  measured  by  mechanical  work. 
Now  mechanical  work  is  equivalent  to  change  in  the  configuration  of 
things.  Energy,  then,  denotes  the  fact  of  change,  or,  rather,  meas- ! 
arable  change,  such  change  as  can  be  quantitatively  determined. 
The  conservation  of  energy  is  an  affirmation  of  a  quantitative 
identity  maintained  throughout  all  change.  For  we  learn  that  I 
energy  has  various  forms,  such  as  heat,  light,  electricity,  magnetism, 
and  that  these  are  convertible ;  that  is,  there  is  a  definite  relationship 
existing  throughout  all  variation,  a  permanent  element  in  the  trans- 
formation. The  great  advance  which  mechanism  has  made  in  the 
explanation  of  phenomena  is  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  able  to 
express  its  laws  in  the  form  of  mathematical  equations.     Such  quan- 

^  *  Popular  Scientific  Lectures,'  translated  by  T.  J.  McCormack,  1898,  p.  164. 


38  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

titative  determination  of  change  supplies  a  detailed  account  of  the 
principle  controlling  nature. 

It  is  important  to  observe  that  the  principle  of  the  conservation 
of  energy  is  not  a  truth  experimentally  derived.  An  inquiry  into  its 
origin  and  the  employment  of  it  in  investigation  discloses  (as  shown 
by  Mach,  Poincare  and  others)  that  it  is  an  assumption  logically 
necessitated  in  the  explanation  of  physical  processes  and  indispen- 

1  sable  for  scientific  research.  Experience  verifies  its  existence,  but 
can  not  originate  the  principle.  Further,  the  whole  force  of  this 
principle  in  physics  necessitates  that  the  principle  determining 
change  exists  inherently  in  the  process  it  characterizes.  Were  the 
principle  regulating  change  located  in  a  foreign  agent,  mechanism 

I  would  be  meaningless. 

The  fundamental  dimensions  of  physical  science,  mass,  length 
and  time,  derive  their  significance  from  the  fact  that  they  tend  to 
supply  means  of  determining  the  exact  conditions  governing  occur- 
rence, the  quantitative  limits  within  which  change  may  take  place. 

i  These  dimensions  are  independent  kinds  of  measurement,  and  as  such 
constitute  so  many  different  ways  of  expressing  relations  between 
phenomena,  of  designating  specific  modes  of  interdependence.  For 
measurement  is  the  definition  of  one  phnomenon  by  another,^  and 
thus  description  of  things  in  quantitative  terms  is  rendered  possible. 

'^  To  conclude,  then,  this  investigation  of  the  concept  of  control  as 
evinced  in  mechanism:  The  general  assumption  of  a  regulation  of 
occurrence  forms  the  basis  of  mechanical  explanation.  The  funda- 
mental constructions  of  physical  science  characterize  the  limiting 
fayctor  of  change  as  a  permanent  element  in  variation.  As  a  de- 
scription of  change  in  measurable  terms,  mechanism  is  compelled 
to  assume  a  quantitative  identity  maintained  throughout  altera- 
tion. It  is  required  that  the  determining  factor  exist  inherently  in 
the  process  it  influences. 

*Mach,  op.  cit.,  p.  206,  note. 


CHAPTER   V 


CONCLUSIONS  AND  REMARKS 


Our  study  of  these  different  instances  illustrating  the  logical 
necessity  of  affirming  control  and  the  way  in  which  this  demand  has 
been  satisfied,  reveals  certain  fundamental  agreements  and  dis- 
similarities among  the  conceptions.  Everywhere  {i.  e.,  in  the  cos- 
mological  theories,  in  the  epistemological  conceptions,  in  the  prin- 
ciples of  biology  and  mechanism)  there  is  the  initial  assumption  of 
a  world  of  change,  and  in  all  these  cases  there  is  the  additional 
affirmation  of  definite  movement  involving  an  identical  element  in 
variation,  a  static  principle  in  the  dynamic  flux,  an  intelligible 
feature  in  sensible  existence.  It  may  be  said  that  pragmatism  does 
not  assert  a  permanent  factor  in  the  experience  process ;  IBut  since  it 
defines  experience  as  an  evolution,  each  stage  the  result  of  a  previous 
condition,  one  situation  or  portion  of  experience  a  transformation 
of  another,  we  feel  justified  in  saying  that  the  permanent  is  im- 
plied in  this  description,  if  not  explicitly  stated. 

The  cosmological  conception,  pragmatic  epistemology,  the  prin- 
ciples of  biology  and  mechanism  agree  in  placing  the  directive  prin- 
ciple wholly  within  the  movement  it  constitutes  a  process.  That  is, 
the  determinate  relation  between  elements  is  dependent  for  its 
nature  upon  the  specific  particulars  it  connects.  It  is  manifested  in 
individuals  as  a  tendency  toward  results,  it  is  a  reference  of  elements 
to  a  dominating  whole. 

In  contrast,  according  to  the  epistemological  movement  termina- 
ting with  Kant,  the  regulative  principle  has  its  origin  in  a  source 
distinct  from  the  material  which  it  unifies.  It  is  constituted  a  sub- 
jective activity,  reason;  while  that  which  it  influences  is  a  cosmic 
reality.  The  history  of  thought  succeeding  this  epistemological 
movement  has  disclosed  the  inconsistencies  and  paradoxes  involved 
in  the  assumption  of  a  dualism  of  realities,  and  thus  has  evinced 
the  need  of  a  different  method  of  approaching  the  question. 

This  leaves  us  with  the  moot  problem :  Is  the  principle  of  control 
a  cosmological  conception,  or  is  it  a  function  of  human  experience? 
Must  it  be  designated  a  characteristic  of  a  life  process,  or  is  it  a  meta- 
physical concept  to  which  the  psychological  is  subordinate  as  a  spe- 
cial case^ 

In  the  analysis  of  the  conception  of  pragmatism,  it  was  discovered 
that  knowledge,  a  controlling  function  of  experience,  points  to  and 
involves  a  transcendent  control,  a  determination  independent  of  our 

39 


AO  THE    CONCEPT    OF    CONTROL 

experience  of  it.  Further,  it  was  maintained  that  knowledge  i 
knowledge  by  virtue  of  this  property  of  cognizing  a  metaphysics 
control,  and  exercises  its  peculiar  function  in  rendering  possibl 
an  intensification  of  a  cosmical  reality.  If  this  position  be  acceptec 
-psychological  control  becomes  a  particular  instance  of  a  gener? 
cosmical  detennination. 

As  an  outcome  of  this  discussion  of  control,  it  appears  that  th 
concept  when  applied  to  reality  results  in  two  specific  modes  c 
describing  the  nature  of  things,  distinguished  by  the  terms  employee 
On  the  one  hand,  there  is  the  qualitative  aspect  of  nature,  incapabl 
of  being  adequately  rendered  in  physical  terms,  and  whose  funds 
mental  nature  is  described  in  the  category  of  purpose.  I  say  pui 
pose,  for  it  seems  that  this  term  as  used  by  Greek  philosophy  is  bes 
fitted  to  express  the  intelligible  character  of  reality  designated  as 
tendency  toward  results.  Again,  in  mechanical  explanation  w 
have  things  described  in  their  quantitative  aspect,  or  in  spatial  c 
physical  terms.  It  is  obvious  that  these  two  modes  of  describing  on 
fundamental  feature  of  reality  are  not  mutually  exclusive  nor  cor 
tradictory,  but  coexist.  Neither  can  be  reduced  to  terms  of  tb 
other;  both  are  diverse  but  essential  modes  of  denoting  the  sam 
characteristic  expressed  in  the  concept  of  control. 

A  word  as  to  some  current  applications  of  the  category.— Tli 
sciences  of  mechanics,  economics  and  sociology,  in  investigating  th 
laws  of  movement  respectively  describing  their  distinctive  ph( 
nomena,  include  as  a  fundamental  prerequisite  the  recognition  of 
set  of  static  principles  which  present  the  conditions  of  equilibriun 
or  the  unchanging.  Mechanics  has  its  department  of  statics,  trea1 
ing  of  those  principles  of  movement  which  are  the  condition  c 
stability.  The  elaboration  of  these  principles  is  a  necessary  antec( 
dent  to  the  formulation  of  the  kinetic  laws,  since  these  static  prii 
ciples  constitute  the  controlling  elements  in  the  entire  field  c 
dynamics.  Similarly,  economics  in  its  constructions  of  the  lau 
governing  the  distribution  of  wealth  in  a  changing  social  organizf 
tion  presents  as  an  indispensable  preliminary,  in  its  theory  of  stati 
social  economics,  the  principles  which  would  be  operative  in  an  ur 
changing  world.  Since  existing  society  always  is  dynamic,  thes 
principles  must  be  abstractions  and  can  have  no  independent  statu! 
Nevertheless  the  static  laws  are  actually  dominant  in  the  variation 
of  wealth  occurring  in  the  development  of  society  and  constitute  th 
standard  to  which  fluctuations  tend  to  conform.  Sociology  describe 
the  process  of  society  as  a  moving  equilibrium.  The  laws  whic 
are  found  to  govern  social  development  embrace  as  a  fundaments 
part  social  statics,  the  laws  of  social  coexistence,  the  conditions  whic 
would  maintain  a  social  stability. 


LOAN  DEPT 

Renewed  books  «-  .-  i- •    ""^  renewed. 


YC  36561 


